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PREFACE 
This publication is a record of the meeting of the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) Task Force on Long-Term Economic 
Planning, held at Schloss Laxenburg in April 1978. It was natural that 
IIASA, having a collaborative East-West Basis, should sponsor a meeting that 
could promote an exchange of experience among centrally planned and mar- 
ket economies. Fourteen leading specialists were invited to present their 
ideas in a seminar-like setting; no formal papers were solicited. The result 
of these informal deliberations is presented here in the form of a progress 
report. 
Pradeep K. Mitra 
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INTRODUCTION 
P.K. M i t r a  
The s t u d y  o f  long- te rm economic p l a n n i n g ,  i . e . ,  of  system- 
a t i c  a t t e m p t s  a t  r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n  c o v e r i n g  10 y e a r s  o r  more,  
may r e q u i r e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  The t a s k  i s  b o t h  complex anddemand-  
i n g .  Its e x e c u t i o n  draws upon a  r a n g e  o f  m u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y  
s k i l l s  o f  which economic a n a l y s i s  forms o n l y  a  p a r t .  The e x e r -  
c i s e  i t s e l f  migh t  seem t o o  remote  from r e a l i t y  t o  b e  r e l e v a n t  
t o  p o l i c y  makers  concerned  w i t h  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  day- to-day 
m a t t e r s .  And y e t ,  it i s  t h i s  l a s t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h a t  a c c e n t u a t e s  
t h e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  long- te rm p l a n n i n g .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  some ( a l b e i t  
i m p e r f e c t l y  a r t i c u l a t e d )  v iews  a b o u t  t h e  f u t u r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  under-  
l i e  much s h o r t - t e r m  d e c i s i o n  making, and t h e r e  i s  much t o  b e  
g a i n e d  from making s u c h  v iews  p r e c i s e .  
I t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  long- te rm p l a n n i n g  e x e r c i s e s  c a n  and  do 
s e r v e  a  v a r i e t y  o f  p u r p o s e s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i e t i e s ,  r a n g i n g  f rom 
t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  s t a b l e  macroeconomic env i ronment  w i t h i n  which 
r e s o u r c e s  may b e  e f f i c i e n t l y  a l l o c a t e d ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  i n f o r m a l  
m u l t i l e v e l  exchanges  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i n d i c a t i v e  
p l a n n i n g ,  t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  programs of development  
b r o a d l y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  s o c i a l i s t  economies .  T h i s  e n c o u r a g e s  
t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  s u c h  d i v e r s e  a l l o c a t i o n  and  s u c h  c o n t r o l m e c h a -  
n i sms  c a n n o t  b e  f i t t e d  i n t o  a g e n e r a l  framework t h a t  is  produc-  
t i v e  o f  u s e f u l  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
it i s  t r u e  t h a t  many of t h e  p rob lems  f a c e d  by p l a n n i n g  a u t h o r i t i e s  
t r a n s c e n d  n a t i o n a l  b o u n d a r i e s  and soc ioeconomic  s y s t e m s .  The 
s m a l l  g r o u p  o f  e c o n o m i s t s  from E a s t  and  W e s t  who formed IIASA's 
Task F o r c e  on long- te rm economic p l a n n i n g  w e r e  a c c o r d i n g l y  con- 
c e r n e d  w i t h  some of  t h e  i s s u e s  t h a t  a  r e f l e c t i v e  l o o k  a t  b o t h  
t h e  t h e o r y  and  p r a c t i c e  o f  p l a n n i n g  b r i n g s  t o  t h e  f o r e .  Promi- 
n e n t  among t h e s e  c o n c e r n s  w e r e  t h e  s c o p e  o f  f o r m a l  models  i n  
economic p l a n n i n g ;  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  n a t i o n a l  p l a n -  
n i n g  p r o c e d u r e s ;  f o r e c a s t i n g  models  a s  a i d s  t o  c o n s i s t e n t  t h i n k -  
i n g  a b o u t  t h e  f u t u r e ;  and  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  a  u n i f i e d  p l a n n i n g  
framework t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s p e c i f i c  a l l o c a t i o n  p rob lems .  
THE SCOPE OF LONG-TERM PLANNING MODELS 
I t  i s  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  d e s c r i b e  p l a n s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  h o r i z o n s  a t  
l e a s t  a s  l o n g  a s  10 y e a r s  a s  b e i n g  l o n g  t e r m  i n  n a t u r e ;  i n  cer- 
t a i n  f i e l d s ,  s u c h  a s  e n e r g y ,  h e a l t h  c a r e ,  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  and 
p o p u l a t i o n ,  t h e  r e l e v a n t  p l a n n i n g  h o r i z o n s  a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
l o n g e r .  The i m p e r f e c t  n a t u r e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  f u t u r e  pos-  
s i b i l i t i e s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a  long- te rm p l a n  c a n n o t  be  r e g a r d e d  a s  
a  f i r m  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  an economy t e n  o r  more y e a r s  hence. Its 
r o l e  i n s t e a d  i s  t o  promote d i s c i p l i n e d  t h i n k i n g  abou t  t h e  f u t u r e ,  
and t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  developments 
f o r  c u r r e n t  a c t i o n .  
Any a t t empt  a t  f o rmula t ing  a  long-term p l a n  has  t o  contend 
w i t h  some f a m i l i a r  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Much of  t h e  d e t a i l e d  s e c t o r a l  
i n fo rma t ion  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  be  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a  c e n t r a l  p lanning  
a u t h o r i t y .  The computat ion of  a  n a t i o n a l  p l a n  of  r ea sonab le  
s i z e  ove r  a  number of y e a r s  might be ve ry  expensive.  An e f f e c -  
t i v e  p l ann ing  a u t h o r i t y  could  t h e r e f o r e  u s e f u l l y  c o n c e n t r a t e  on 
a g g r e g a t i v e  models t h a t  i n d i c a t e  t h e  more prominent f e a t u r e s  of 
s t r u c t u r a l  economic change ove r  t h e  nex t  10-20 y e a r s ;  t y p i c a l l y  
t hey  w i l l  s k e t c h  p r o f i l e s  of  c a p i t a l  accumula t ion ,  i n t e r s e c t o r a l  
mig ra t ion ,  changes i n  a  c o u n t r y ' s  p a t t e r n  of f o r e i g n  t r a d e ,  e t c .  
Such an approach p r e s e n t s  a  panoramic view of s t r a t e g i c  long-term 
o p t i o n s ;  t h e  under ly ing  assumptions and methodology can t h e n  be 
s u b j e c t s  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  among t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and agenc i e s  i n -  
volved i n  t h e  p lanning  p roces s .  The d e s i r a b i l i t y  of  making c l e a r  
t h e  consequences of i m p l i c i t l y  h e l d  views about  t h e  f u t u r e  has  
a l r e a d y  been noted .  Seve ra l  i n t e r r e l a t e d  q u e s t i o n s  were r a i s e d  
i n  t h i s  connect ion  a t  t h e  Task Force  meet ings ,  and they  a r e  
b r i e f l y  ca t a logued  below. 
Which f e a t u r e s  of s t r u c t u r a l  change should be h i g h l i g h t e d  
i n  an  aggrega ted  p e r s p e c t i v e  p lan?  Th i s  i s  a  problem f o r  which 
economists  a l o n e  a r e  not  equipped t o  provide  s o l u t i o n s .  Perspec-  
t i v e  long-term planning  models,  i f  t hey  a r e  t o  be  both  manageable 
and e a s i l y  unders tood ,  can  f e a t u r e  on ly  t h e  more impor tan t  s t r u c -  
t u r a l  changes t h a t  a  s o c i e t y  i s  l i k e l y  t o  undergo, and economists  
can expec t  much guidance from s o c i o l o g i s t s ,  h i s t o r i a n s ,  and p o l i t -  
i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s  on t h e  m a t t e r .  Cons iderable  imagina t ion  and 
p r e s c i e n c e  must t h e r e f o r e  inform t h e  most formal  p e r s p e c t i v e  
p l ann ing  e x e r c i s e ;  any a t t e m p t  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  a  mechanical  enumera- 
t i o n  of  a  l a r g e  number of p o s s i b l e  s c e n a r i o s  f o r  an imag ina t ive  
l e a p  of i n t u i t i o n  w i l l  dese rve  t o  f a i l .  Augus t inovics  and Porwi t  
i n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  dwel l  on t h i s  s e t  o f  i s s u e s .  
What i s  t h e  most u s e f u l  agg rega t ion  over  v a r i o u s  p a r t s  of 
t h e  economy f o r  t h e  purposes  of t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  p l an?  To which 
t r a d e d  and non-traded s e c t o r s  should such a  p l a n  pay s p e c i a l  
a t t e n t i o n ?  The answers t o  such q u e s t i o n s  depend on what a r e  
judged t o  be key s e c t o r s  i n  t h e  development of t h e  economy, from 
t h e  domest ic  p o i n t  of  view and from t h a t  of f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  Not 
o n l y  do l i m i t a t i o n s  of d a t a  and computa t iona l  f a c i l i t i e s  impose 
c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  e x t e n t  of d i s a g g r e g a t i o n ;  t h e o r y  l ends  no 
suppor t  t o  t h e  no t ion  t h a t  more d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  i s  b e t t e r .  O r ,  
t o  p u t  t h e  p o i n t  ano the r  way, long-term planning  models,  wh i l e  
be ing  most u s e f u l  a s  r e c o n n o i t e r i n g  d e v i c e s  f o r  de te rmining  
broad p o l i c y  o p t i o n s ,  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  i l l - s u i t e d  t o  handle  t h e  
d e t a i l  a t t e n d i n g  m u l t i s e c t o r a l  p l ann ing .  A compl ica ted  economy- 
wide model may d e f e a t  i t s  own methodologica l  purpose by obscur ing  
r a t h e r  t h a n  i l l u m i n a t i n g  f u t u r e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  A r e l a t e d  p o i n t  
a p p l i e s  t o  " p r i c e "  agg rega t ion .  Long-term macroeconomic p lanning  
models can be used t o  d e r i v e  shadow wage r a t e s ,  exchange r a t e s ,  
and accoun t ing  r a t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t .  These a r e  summary s t a t i s t i c s  
t h a t  convey in fo rma t ion  about  f u t u r e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  open t o  an 
economy more r e a d i l y  t h a n  d i sagg rega t ed  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  p r i c e  
systems from which they  should  i d e a l l y  be d e r i v e d .  An i n t e r e s t -  
i ng  methodologica l  problem h e r e  i s  t o  d e v i s e  a  framework w i t h i n  
which t h e  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  of  g r e a t e r  d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  can be 
a s s e s s e d  [ I  ]  . 
I n  which ways can t h e  s tudy  of  a l t e r n a t i v e  o b j e c t i v e  func- 
t i o n s  h e l p  t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  n a t u r e  of long-term c h o i c e s  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  p l anne r s?  Reference has  been made above t o  p lanning  a s  a  
method of  e x p l o r i n g  t h e  domain of f e a s i b i l i t y .  Indeed ,  a  number 
of s t y l i z e d  i t e r a t i v e  d i a l o g u e s  f o r  e l i c i t i n g  t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n f o r -  
mation from producers  have been ana lyzed  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  The 
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  s o c i e t a l  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  i n t o  t h e s e  procedures  
f o c u s e s  a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  t e c h n i c a l  c h o i c e s  t h a t  a  s o c i e t y  has  t o  
make i n  o r d e r  t o  r e a l i z e  i t s  g o a l s .  When c o n s i d e r i n g  f u t u r e  
developments  it i s  c l e a r l y  more e f f i c i e n t  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on p l a n s  
t h a t  h e l p  f u r t h e r  s o c i e t a l  o b j e c t i v e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  on t h e  e n t i r e  
s e t  o f  f e a s i b l e  p l ans .  But t h e r e  i s  ano the r  advantage .  Assume 
t h a t  f o r  eve ry  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  t h e r e  a r e  cor responding  f e a s i b l e  
p l a n s  maximizing i t s  va lue  (mathematical  economists  w i l l  want t o  
s a t i s f y  themselves  of  t h e  c o n t i n u i t y  of  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  
and t h e  nonemptiness and compactness of t h e  f e a s i b l e  s e t  b e f o r e  
a g r e e i n g ) .  The p lanning  a u t h o r i t y  can  t h e n  examine t h e  response  
of op t ima l  p l a n s  t o  d i f f e r e n t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  of  o b j e c t i v e  func- 
t i o n s .  Such an e x e r c i s e  cou ld ,  f o r  example, h e l p  p l anne r s  t o  
a s s e s s  t h e  consequences of  adop t ing  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  charac-  
t e r i z e d  by d i f f e r e n t  deg rees  of  i n e q u a l i t y  t h a t  a  s o c i e t y  i s  
prepa red  t o  t o l e r a t e ,  b e f o r e  t hey  dec ide  on a  r ea sonab le  v a l u e  
f o r  t h e  l a t t e r  parameter .  Th i s  p o i n t  i s  e l a b o r a t e d  by M i l l e r o n  
i n  h i s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e  Task Force .  
How can a  p e r s p e c t i v e  p l an  h e l p  t o  emphasize t h e  e f f e c t  of  
u n c e r t a i n t y  on p o s s i b l y  i r r e v e r s i b l e  long-term inves tment  d e c i -  
s i o n s ?  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  l onge r  t h e  t ime ho r i zon  contemplated,  
t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  number of  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  p l anne r s  would c o n s i d e r  
endogenous. T h i s  a p p l i e s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t o  inves tment  d e c i s i o n s  
t h a t  have long  g e s t a t i o n  p e r i o d s ;  it i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t  
t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  c i rcumstances  i n  which such a c t s  of  inves tment  
w i l l  come t o  f r u i t i o n .  One c o n s i d e r a t i o n  adding s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
t o  t h e  importance of t h e s e  e x e r c i s e s  i s  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n ,  f o r  
example, t o  engage i n  commercial development of a  s c e n i c  wooded 
a r e a ,  o r  t o  deve lop  a  nuclear-based energy program i s ,  w i t h  a  
p o s i t i v e  r a t e  of t ime p r e f e r e n c e ,  a lmost  i r r e v e r s i b l e .  Should 
such d e c i s i o n s  be t aken  now, o r  a t  a  l a t e r  d a t e  when more i n f o r -  
mation about  t h e  f u t u r e  might become a v a i l a b l e ?  The i n t r i n s i c  
u n c e r t a i n t y  sur rounding  t h e  f u t u r e  and t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of be- 
coming b e t t e r  informed might provide  an  argument i n  f a v o r  of 
keeping o p t i o n s  open. Long-term p l ann ing  can h e l p  c a l c u l a t i o n s  
of  o p t i o n  v a l u e s  and hence improve t h e  t iming  of  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  
have i r r e v e r s i b l e  consequences [ 2 , 3 ] .  
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY 
Whether o r  no t  a  proposed r e sou rce  a l l o c a t i o n  procedure ,  
be it compe t i t i on ,  market s o c i a l i s m ,  o r  a  n e g a t i v e  income t a x  
system, has  any d e s i r a b l e  p r o p e r t i e s  depends on t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
environment i n  which it i s  expected  t o  o p e r a t e .  Many s o c i e t i e s  
a r e  n o t  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  deg ree  o f  cohes ion  t h a t  encourages 
i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  i d e n t i f y  n a t i o n a l  ( o r  c e n t r a l  p l a n n e r s ' ? )  g o a l s  
a s  t h e i r  own. T h i s  c r e a t e s  i n c e n t i v e s  bo th  t o  wi thhold  and 
manipula te  i n fo rma t ion ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  d e p a r t  from t h e  r u l e s  of  
behavior  l a i d  down from above. The a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
v i a b i l i t y  of  r e sou rce  a l l o c a t i o n  mechanisms d a t e s  back a t  l e a s t  
a s  f a r  a s  Edgeworth, and has  been t h e  s u b j e c t  of  much r e c e n t  
i n t e r e s t .  Hildenbrand and Kirman [4] o f f e r  a  convenient  expos i -  
t i o n  and b ib l iog raphy .  Consider  a n  a l l o c a t i o n  of r e sou rces  and 
a  c o a l i t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  an  economy. A c o a l i t i o n  t h a t  i s  
a b l e  t o  r e d i s t r i b u t e  r e sou rces  among i t s  members t o  ach i eve  a l -  
l o c a t i o n  Pare towise  s u p e r i o r  f o r  them i s  c a l l e d  a  b locking  c o a l i -  
t i o n .  The most c e l e b r a t e d  r e s u l t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  d a t e  a rgues  t h a t  
( a )  i f  t h e  i n fo rma t ion  and communication c o s t s  of  forming block-  
i n g  c o a l i t i o n s  a r e  n e g l i g i b l e  enough t o  permi t  t h e i r  c r e a t i o n  
whenever an oppor tun i ty  a r i s e s ,  and ( b )  i f  t h e  number o f  economic 
a g e n t s  becomes very  l a r g e  s o  t h a t  no a g e n t  can  e x e r c i s e  a  s i g -  
n i f i c a n t  degree  of  power, t h e n  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l o c a t i o n s  t h a t  can- 
n o t  be blocked by any c o a l i t i o n  i s  reduced t o  t h e  s e t  of compet- 
i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i a .  The assumptions about  i n fo rma t ion  and commu- 
n i c a t i o n  used t o  d e r i v e  t h i s  conc lus ion  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  be f u l -  
f i l l e d  i n  most s o c i e t i e s ;  t h e  above theorem may t h e r e f o r e  m i s -  
judge t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a g i l i t y  of  t h e  compe t i t i ve  mechanism. 
Neve r the l e s s ,  it c l a r i f i e s  why it i s  necessary  f o r  t h e  number 
of a g e n t s  t o  be l a r g e  f o r  compe t i t i on  t o  "work" i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
c l a s s  o f  ca se s .  And, t o  t a k e  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  most d i s cus sed  
example, it can  be expec ted  t o  shed l i g h t  on t h e  c i rcumstances  
i n  which market  s o c i a l i s m  i s  an incen t ivewise  s a t i s f a c t o r y  plan-  
n ing  procedure .  
The need t o  exp lo re  i n c e n t i v e  problems, though widely recog- 
n i z e d  d i d  n o t  f i n d  formal  exp re s s ion  i n  t h e  Lanqe-Lerner and r e -  
l a t e d  approaches t o  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  p lanning  [5,6]. These exer -  
c i s e s ,  which a r e  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of i t e r a t i v e  d i a l o g u e s ,  a r e  
under taken  by a  p lanning  a u t h o r i t y  t o  g e n e r a t e  i n fo rma t ion  about  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  and o t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  open t o  t h e  economy. It 
t h e r e f o r e  becomes necessary  t o  model t h e  i n fo rma t ion  gap between 
p l a n n e r s  and o t h e r  a g e n t s  and t o  examine t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  m i s -  
r e p r e s e n t  i n fo rma t ion  t o  which such a  gap g i v e s  r i s e .  T h i s  a l s o  
has  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  cho ice  of c o n t r o l  i n s t rumen t s :  what 
combinat ion of t a x e s ,  q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i c e n s i n g ,  and moral  exhor t a -  
t i o n  i s  deemed t o  be t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  i n  any p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y ?  
A g e n e r a l  t r e a t m e n t  of  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s ,  which a r e  b a s i c  t o  t h e  
economics o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  behav io r ,  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be q u i t e  d i f -  
f i c u l t ,  and t h e o r i s t s  have found it convenient  t o  proceed i n  
s t a g e s .  
A particular organization that has proved amenable to eco- 
nomic analysis is the "team" [7]. All members of a team, while 
sharing the same goals, have access to different information. 
The resulting lack of intraorganizational conflict allows a 
simpler treatment of the possible gains from information pooling 
and of the effects of alternative planning instruments on social 
outcomes. Such a team-theoretic framework has been used to 
assess the relative superiority of pricing policy (taxes) ver- 
sus quantitative regulations (licenses and quotas) in the de- 
centralized control of environmental pollution under technologi- 
cal uncertainty, and to provide solutions to these issues in cer- 
tain special cases [ a ,  91 . 
The study of teams, however, can provide only a partial 
solution, because incentive problems arise most naturally in 
situations where agents subscribe to a multiplicity of goals. 
What kind of behavioral rules can possibly be implemented given 
imperfect information? Public economists have recently studied 
similar questions in designing redistributive tax-subsidy mecha- 
nisms. The lump sum redistribution, central to the fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics, is unlikely to be incentive com- 
patible [10,11]. The properties of planning procedures that 
help to support an optimum allocation of public goods in the face 
of incorrect revelation of preferences have also been examined 
within the framework of noncooperative game theory [I 2,131 . This 
approach can also provide a first cut at the general problem of 
the design of incentive-compatible planning procedures in a 
society comprising a plurality of interests, and where the govern- 
ment has access to imperfect (and possibly manipulated) informa- 
tion. 
The preceding paragraphs have outlined some difficulties 
that a satisfactory treatment of incentive-compatible allocation 
would aim to overcome. However, the reader who is left with the 
impression that the problem is of interest to economic theorists 
alone is reminded that similar preoccupations have underlain the 
economic reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during 
the last 15 years. Tardos in his paper considers some of the 
problems that have encouraged Hungarian planners to reexamine 
certain incentive schemes. Thus, to focus on one specificexam- 
ple, it might be in the interest of an enterprise in a centrally 
planned economy to understate its true production possibilities 
to the planning authorities in the hope of being asked to meet 
a modest target; in this way the enterprise can overfulfill it 
with ease, and earn a large bonus. A parallel problem arises in 
intertemporal planning, where an enterprise would not wish to be 
conspicuously successful in the present period, fearing that ob- 
served current successes might elicit high targets for the next 
period. Some insight into what the new economic reforms seek to 
achieve is provided by the following analysis, which represents 
Soviet planning as proceeding in three stages [ I  41 . 
I n  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  phase  t h e  c e n t r a l  p l a n n i n g  a u t h o r i t y  
(CPA), which i s  p a r t i a l l y  in formed  a b o u t  t r u e  p r o d u c t i o n  sets,  
p r o p o s e s  a  t e n t a t i v e  o u t p u t  t a r g e t ,  y ,  t o  an  e n t e r p r i s e ,  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  a  bonus f u n d ,  B ,  t o  which it would be e n t i t l e d  i f  t h e  
t a r g e t  were a c h i e v e d .  The e n s e r p r i s e  r e s p o n d s  i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  
p h a s e  by s e l e c t i n g  a  t a r g e t ,  y ,  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  i t s  produc- 
t i o n  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  t h e  bonus gund, B, announced 
i n  t h e  pre; iminary p h a s e ,  w i l l  b e  r e v i s e d  t o  B  a s  f o l l o w s :  
B  = B + B(y - y ) .  At  t h e  implementa t ion  s t a g e ,  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  
p r o d u c e s  a n  o u t p u t ,  y ,  and r e c e i v e s  a n  a c t u a l  bonus B  g i v e n  by 
,. + . (Y - A : y  2 y  ( o v e r f u l f  i l l m e n t )  
A 
B  - y ( y  - y )  : y  < y  ( u n d e r f u l f i l l m e n t )  
where  0  < a < B < y .  
T h i s  t h r e e - s t e p  p r o c e d u r e  i n s u r e s  t h a t  p r o d u c t i o n  t a r g e t s  
a r e  set by e n t e r p r i s e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  CPA and t h a t  d e v i a t i o n s  
f rom t h o s e  t a r g e t s  a t t r a c t  p e n a l t i e s .  The sys tem t h e r e f o r e  
e n c o u r a g e s  e n t e s p r i s e s  t o  set t a r g e t s  ( y )  t h a t  t h e y  hope t o  
a c h i e v e ,  i . e . ,  y . =  y! t h i s  example,  more g e n e r a l l y ,  i s  a  s i m p l e  
b u t  e l e g a n t  a p p l l c a t l o n  o f  i n c e n t i v e - t h e o r e t i c  i d e a s  t o  p l a n n i n g  
problems.  
R e f e r e n c e  h a s  a l r e a d y  been made above t o  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n ' s  
i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  d e s i g n  o f  i n c e n t i v e - c o m p a t i b l e  mechanisms f o r  
remedying i n e q u a l i t y  i n  g e n e r a l  and  t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income 
i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  The r e c e n t  e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  p rob lems  h a s  
c l a r i f i e d  o u r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  e f f i c a c y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c y  
packages  i n  s e c u r i n g  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  e n d s ;  an  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  what 
h a s  been  a c h i e v e d ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h ,  
a p p e a r  i n  t h e  p a p e r  by S t i g l i t z .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  l i v e l y ,  contempo- 
r a r y  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p l a n n i n g  and  income 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  c o u l d  p r o f i t a b l y  c e n t e r  on  t h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  pub- 
l i c  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s :  e f f i c i e n c y ,  e q u i t y ,  and  i n c e n t i v e  com- 
p a t i b i l i t y .  But it i s  worth r e i t e r a t i n g  t h a t  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e s e  
income r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  problems a r e  n o t  " t e c h n i c a l "  i n  t h e  narrow 
s e n s e :  whe ther  o r  n o t  a  mechanism i s  i n c e n t i v e  c o m p a t i b l e ,  f o r  
example,  depends  on t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework i n  which it i s  
embedded. 
FORECASTING MODELS 
Macroeconomic models  have been  e x t e n s i v e l y  u s e d  i n  r e c e n t  
y e a r s  f o r  s h o r t - t e r m  f o r e c a s t i n g  p u r p o s e s  ( 1  t o  3 y e a r s )  i n  
many of  t h e  "market"  economies.  These models  have n o t  t o  d a t e  
p l a y e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  l o n g e r - t e r m  p l a n n i n g ,  b u t  t h a t s i t u a -  
t i o n  may b e  changing .  The r e c e n t  economic slowdown and  t h e  p e r -  
c e i v e d  need f o r  a  new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic o r d e r  n e c e s s a r i l y  
a f f e c t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  under  which t h e  fo rmula t ion  and implementa- 
t i o n  of  long-term p l a n s  can be c a r r i e d  o u t .  Th i s  imp l i e s  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  t h a t  more a t t e n t i o n  must be devoted t o  problems of  
demand f o r e c a s t i n g  and c a p a c i t y  c r e a t i o n  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r ,  
even i n  long-term planning ,  t h a n  has  h i t h e r t o  been t h e  c a s e .  
The c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by Kle in  and Witcomb, r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  Wharton 
and Cambridge ( U K )  modeling e f f o r t s  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  demonst ra te  
what can  be achieved  g iven  o u r  c u r r e n t  s t a t e  of  knowledge. 
I t  is  n a t u r a l  t o  a s k  what purposes  models a s  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
a s  t h o s e  of t h e  Wharton and Cambridge groups  a r e  des igned  t o  
s e r v e .  Those engaged i n  c o n s t r u c t i n g  and manipula t ing  t h e  models 
would probably  answer t h a t  t h e y  a r e  a i d s  t o  c o n s i s t e n t  t h i n k i n g  
about  t h e  f u t u r e .  This  s u p p o s i t i o n ,  i f  c o r r e c t ,  sugges t s  t h a t  
t h e  models a r e  most u s e f u l  when they  a r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  t o  i l l u m i -  
n a t e  s p e c i f i c  ends  t o  t h e  p o s s i b l e  exc lus ion  of  o t h e r s .  Examples 
of  such ends  a r e :  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  of an overview of  a  p a r t i c -  
u l a r  economy i n  t h e  yea r  1990 ;  t h e  long-term consequences of  
domest ic  macroeconomic p o l i c i e s  on employment and c a p a c i t y  c r ea -  
t i o n ;  and t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  of p r o j e c t i o n s  t o  assumptions about  
t h e  behavior  of  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s .  Another a p p l i c a t i o n  of f o r e -  
c a s t i n g  models,  explored  by Nagy i n  h i s  paper ,  i s  t h e  s imu l t a -  
neous t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  expor t  and import  s e c t o r s  of  a  system o f  
t r a d i n g  c o u n t r i e s  t o  a r r i v e  a t  mutua l ly  c o n s i s t e n t  long-term 
f o r e c a s t s ;  t h e s e  e x e r c i s e s  can s t i m u l a t e  d i s c u s s i o n  abou t  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  economic p o l i c i e s .  
T h i s  i s  no t  t h e  p l a c e  t o  embark upon a  d e t a i l e d  c r i t i q u e  o f  
econometr ic  f o r e c a s t i n g  models. But it might be i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  
i l l u s t r a t e  some p o i n t s  a l r e a d y  made on t h e  scope of p l an  modeling 
i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t .  F o r e c a s t e r s  need t o  have a  f e e l  f o r  
s t r u c t u r a l  change: t h a t  i s  a  he rcu l ean  t a s k  f o r  e l u s i v e  economic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  a s  demonstrated by t h e  p o s s i b l e  s e n s i t i v i t y  of 
p r e d i c t i o n s  t o  s l i g h t  a l t e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  amodel .  
A preoccupat ion  wi th  t h e s e  m a t t e r s ,  impor tan t  though t h e y  a r e ,  
i s ,  however, a d d i t i o n a l  t o  t h e  need t o  a n t i c i p a t e  changes i n  t h e  
s o c i a l  environment w i t h i n  which t h e  economic model f u n c t i o n s .  
Secondly,  t h e  degree  of agg rega t ion  i n  t h e  model i s  t a i l o r e d  t o  
t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of r e l i a b l e  d a t a  and t o  t h e  requi rements  o f t h e  
problem a t  hand. T h i r d l y ,  p r e s c r i b i n g  s p e c i f i e d  t a r g e t s  i n  a  
f o r e c a s t i n g  model h e l p s  t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  long-term c h o i c e s  t h a t  
a  s o c i e t y  must make i n  o r d e r  t o  a t t a i n  t h o s e  t a r g e t s .  And, 
f i n a l l y ,  t h e  e x e r c i s e  i t s e l f  can promote a  d i a logue  about  f u t u r e  
developments by i n c o r p o r a t i n g  feedback from a  pane l  of u s e r s ;  
t h i s  i s  c e r t a i n l y  t r u e  o f  t h e  Wharton model and i n c r e a s i n g l y  s o  
of  t h e  o t h e r  major e f f o r t s .  
APPLICATIONS 
--
Three a p p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  u se  of a  p lanning  framework f o r  
t a c k l i n g  s p e c i f i c  problems were p re sen ted  a t  t h e  meet ings  of  t h e  
Task Force.  Althouqh seemingly d i v e r s e ,  t hey  sha red  t h e  p rope r ty  
of reflecting the profession's growing concern with the relation- 
ship between long-term planning and economic inequality. This 
relationship is particularly important in the design of educa- 
tional and social security systems, as the papers by Weiss and 
Sheshinski make clear. Both of these areas of economic planning 
are characterized by long time horizons and have importantimpli- 
cations for the distribution of income and wealth between and 
across generations. The third example, developed in Bell's 
paper, illustrates the use of a macroeconomic model to derive 
distributional weights and other summary statistics for applica- 
tion in social cost-benefit analysis in a developing region of 
the Third World. 
C0NCLU.S ION 
In conclusion, it is worth noting the two major themesthat 
preoccupied participants from both East and West during the 
meetings of the Task Force. The first was concerned with de- 
limiting the extent to which formal models could provide useful 
aids to decision making about the future and with the need to 
combine them with qualitative and perhaps more informal consid- 
erations. The second emphasized the importance of examining 
the institutional viability of planning viewed as a resource 
allocation mechanism. If IIASA can create a network that en- 
courages economists in its member countries and elsewhere to 
undertake selected cast studies designed to elicit general les- 
sons in these two areas, these meetings will have served a use- 
ful purpose. 
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I .  THE SCOPE OF FORMAL MODELS 
I N  P L A N N I N G  

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN MODEL BUILDING FOR 
LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PLANNING 
M. Augustinovics 
When studying the issues involved in model building for 
long-term economic planning, it is necessary to ask oneself the 
following questions: 
- What is really meant by "long-term planning"? 
- What are the purposes for which mathematical models 
are used in long-term planning? 
- What are the particular problems encountered when 
constructing long-term models? 
An attempt will be made to look into the types of models that 
have been used in the Hungarian planning process. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LONG-TERM PLANNING 
Long-term planning can be clarified by examining the neces- 
sity of planning; its nature; the methodology involved; and the 
institutional aspects of the process. 
It is necessary because of the long-term consequences of 
many economic processes, e.g., investment. Planning for a time 
period of ten to fifteen years does not simply mean taking deci- 
sions today about the future course of economic events, but, 
more than that, it involves thinking in a disciplined way about 
the future consequences of present decisions. One of two alter- 
native approaches can be taken: to prepare detailed plans for 
the most crucial sectors of the economy only, e.g., energy, 
agriculture, or to make general plans for all sectors. Hungary 
has chosen to combine both approaches; designing detailed pro- 
jects for the most relevant sectors, which are viewed in rela- 
tion to future developments in the whole economy. The major 
difficulty in applying this method in Hungary is the inability 
and/or unwillingness of different sectors to develop projections 
of the future. There is also a problem originating from the 
institutional aspects of the process. The personnel directly 
involved in planning are usually not well equipped to produce 
the different long-term scenarios, whereas people with some 
imaginative capacity do not have the necessary experience in 
planning. In other words, there may not be much overlapbetween 
people with the two qualifications essential for the success of 
the process. 
THE USE OF MATHEMATICAL MODELS I N  PLANNING 
The a c t u a l  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s  i s  i t e r a t i v e .  Q u a n t i t a t i v e  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  consequences  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  p a t h s  i s  needed 
t o  a s s i s t  d e c i s i o n  makers i n  making c h o i c e s .  Mathemat ica l  models 
used  i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  i n i t i a l l y  a im t o  a c h i e v e  a  
macroeconomic s y n t h e s i s  ( o r  c o o r d i n a t i o n )  o f  p a r t i a l  models .  
The s t u d y  o f  s i m u l t a n e o u s  s t r a t e g i e s ,  by working o u t  t h e  a l t e r -  
n a t i v e  f e a s i b l e  p a t h s  f o r  a n  economy, and by t a k i n g  i n t o a c c o u n t  
s o c i a l  c o s t s  and r e w a r d s ,  i s  a n  a i d  t o  d e c i s i o n  making. 
Models used  i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s  must b e  o p e r a t i o n a l ,  
y i e l d i n g  q u a n t i t a t i v e  s o l u t i o n s .  Two g r o u p s  o f  models c a n  b e  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d :  p l a n n i n g  models ,  which produce  macroeconomic 
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and a n a l y t i c a l  models ,  which a n a l y z e  t h e  p a s t ,  
p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e  v a r i a n t s .  L a r g e - s c a l e  models g i v i n g  i n s i g h t  
i n t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  economy a r e  u s e f u l ,  b u t  t h e y  s h o u l d  n o t  
b e  s o  complex a s  t o  be u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  t o  a l l  b u t  a  few p e o p l e .  
I n  Hungary v a r i o u s  models a r e  u s e d  i n  long- te rm p l a n n i n g ,  
d i f f e r i n g  i n  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  a g g r e g a t i o n  o v e r  t i m e  and s e c t o r s .  
Those t h a t  a r e  used t o  produce m a c r o a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  l i n e a r  
programing models ,  whose p r i n c i p a l  r o l e  i s  t o  h e l p  e x p l o r e  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  t h e  long- run  c h o i c e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a n  economy. The 
l i n e a r i t y  assumpt ion  i s  no s e v e r e  l i m i t a t i o n ,  s i n c e  o u r  knowledge 
of  n o n - l i n e a r  r e l a t i o n s  i s  s m a l l .  When known, n o n - l i n e a r i t i e s  
c a n  o f t e n  be i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  t h e  l i n e a r  s t r u c t u r e .  
THE ENDOGENEITY OF PROCESSES OVER A  LONG-TERM PERIOD 
An i m p o r t a n t  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  i s s u e  i n  long-term model b u i l d i n g ,  
is  t h a t  many more p r o c e s s e s  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s  become endogenous 
o v e r  a  long- te rm p e r i o d .  The f o l l o w i n g  examples  c a n  b e  ment ioned:  
- P u r e  economic changes  t a k e  p l a c e  more r a p i d l y  t h a n s o c i a l  
o n e s .  The l a t t e r  c a n  t h e r e f o r e ,  o n l y  be t a k e n  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  i n  t h e  l o n g  r u n .  However, t h e  c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n  
d e s i r e d  s o c i a l  g o a l s ,  e - g . ,  m a i n t a i n i n g  and improving 
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  f o r  a l l  members o f  a  s o c i e t y ,  s o c i a l  
m o b i l i t y ,  and i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  i s  r a t h e r  weak, p a r t l y  
a s  a  consequence of i n a d e q u a t e  knowledge. 
- F o r e i g n  t r a d e  becomes endogenous,  f o r  example,  when a  
c o u n t r y  i s  a b l e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  i t s e x p o r t s  
o v e r  t h e  long  t e r m .  
- The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between o u t p u t  and i n v e s t m e n t  i s  such  
t h a t  c u r r e n t  o u t p u t  depends on p a s t  i n v e s t m e n t ,  and 
t h e r e f o r e  c u r r e n t  i n v e s t m e n t  w i l l  d e t e r m i n e  f u t u r e  
o u t p u t .  
- S h o r t - t e r m  changes  do  n o t  have any s i g n i f i c a n t  i n f l u e n c e  
on r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s .  I n  long-term models ,  however,  one 
c a n  s t u d y  t h e  feedback  between changes  i n  t h e  p r i c e  s t r u c -  
t u r e  and r e a l  economic v a r i a b l e s .  C u r r e n t  knowledge o f  
t r a n s m i s s i o n  mechanisms, e . g . ,  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  i s  
l i m i t e d .  
A t  p r e s e n t ,  i n  Hungary, t h e r e  i s  a  need t o  c o n s t r u c t  d e t a i l e d  
s e c t o r a l  models t h a t ,  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  e x p l o r e  long- run  changes  
i n  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  go  beyond a  m e r e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  economic 
changes .  
DISCUSSION 
A r t h u r  s t r e s s e d  t h e  impor tance  o f  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  s o c i a l  
f a c t o r s .  The s i z e  o f  models s h o u l d  be l a r g e  enough t o  encompass 
t h e  set  o f  i s s u e s  b e i n g  s t u d i e d .  H e  a s k e d  i f  s i m u l a t i o n s  were 
done u s i n g  d i f f e r e n t  sets of  c o n s t r a i n t s .  
A u g u s t i n o v i c s  s a i d  t h a t ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  c u r r e n t  o p i n i o n ,  
long- te rm models s h o u l d ,  i n  some a r e a s ,  b e  more d e t a i l e d  t h a n  
s h o r t - t e r m  models .  T h i s  can  b e  accompl i shed  by t h e  u s e  o f  v a r i -  
o u s  a l t e r n a t i v e  models.  I n  s i m u l a t i o n ,  s e v e r a l  sets o f  con- 
s t r a i n t s  a r e  used t o  t r a c e  a l t e r n a t i v e  f e a s i b l e  p a t h s .  Con- 
c e r n i n g  s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t s ,  one  s h o u l d  a lways  have  a  comprehensive 
view,  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  development  o f  t h e  whole economy; 
t h i s  i s  a  c e n t r a l  i d e a  i n  p l a n n i n g .  
CHOICE OF OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS I N  ECONOMIC PLANNING 
J. -C. Mil l e ron  
S o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n s  have been used i n  p lanning  proces-  
s e s  f o r  s e v e r a l  reasons :  
- They a r e  convenient  means of  e x p l o r i n g  and narrowing 
down t h e  s e t  o f  f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s  i n  an o p t i m i z a t i o n  
p roces s ,  t h e  s e t  o f  bounding hyperp lanes  be ing  i n t e r -  
p r e t e d  i n  t h i s  c a s e  a s  s o c i a l  i n d i f f e r e n c e  cu rves .  
- They se rve  a s  t o o l s  f o r  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  i n  mathematical  
programming; an o v e r a l l  s o l u t i o n  can  then  be computed a s  
a  sum of  v a r i o u s  p a r t i a l  s o l u t i o n s .  
- I t  i s  be l i eved  t h a t  t hey  can c o r r e c t l y  e x p r e s s  t h e v a l u e s  
o f  a  s o c i e t y ;  t h i s  p o i n t  i s  open t o  d i s c u s s i o n .  
- It i s  thought  t h a t  i n  a  democra t ic  s o c i e t y  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  
f u n c t i o n s  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  t a s t e s  of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  
i n  t h a t  s o c i e t y .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  d e a l  w i th  problems of  s o c i a l  c h o i c e ,  it is  
neces sa ry  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  make e x p l i c i t  a l l  t h e  consequences 
o f  v a r i o u s  a l t e r n a t i v e  c r i t e r i a .  I t  is  l e f t  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s  
t o  dec ide  which one i s  used. 
Another p o i n t  t h a t  de se rves  c l o s e r  a t t e n t i o n  is  t h e  connec- 
t i o n  between t h e  cho ice  of  a  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n  and e q u i t y  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  ( s e e  be low) .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  i n  c e r t a i n  circum- 
s t a n c e s  t o  proceed some way i n  an  i t e r a t i v e  p lanning  e x e r c i s e  
w i thou t  having t o  i n t roduce  a  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n  [ I ] .  
For  t h e  cho ice  o f  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n s  i n  mathematical  
models,  two c a s e s  can be i s o l a t e d :  
- Where one assumes t h a t  people  have t h e  same t a s t e s  b u t  
d i f f e r e n t  endowments. 
- Where one assumes t h a t  people  have d i f f e r e n t  t a s t e s  and 
d i f f e r e n t  endowments. 
Two approaches can be i d e n t i f i e d  i n  economic l i t e r a t u r e  
[ 2 , 3 1 :  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  approach and t h e  Rawlsian approach.  
I n  t h e  c a s e  1  above, two subcases  can be cons ide red .  Le t  
u (x ,L )  be t h e  s o c i a l  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  where x  r e f e r s  t o  consump- 
t i o n ,  and L t o  l abo r .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  subcase ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  n  i n  s o c i e t y  i s  known; t hen  t h e  
op t ima l  s i t u a t i o n  may be ob ta ined  by maximizing t h e  mathemat- 
i c a l  e x p e c t a t i o n  of  u t i l i t y  
"2 
max 1 u [ x ( n ) , L ( n ) l f ( n ) d n  . 
I n  t h e  second subcase ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  q u a l i f i c a -  
t i o n s  i n  s o c i e t y  i s  unknown; h e r e ,  t h e  b e s t  s o l u t i o n  i s  t hemax i -  
min s o l u t i o n :  
max{min u[x ( n )  , a  ( n )  ]  3 . 
n 
Case 2  i s  seldom cons idered  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  because of  
t h e  y e t  unsolved problems o f  agg rega t ion  [ 4 ] .  A s o l u t i o n  t o  
t h i s  problem can  perhaps  be found along t h e  fo l lowing  l i n e s :  
by making e x p l i c i t  a  r e q u i r e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income over  and 
above t h e  cho ice  of  a  s o c i a l  we l f a r e  f u n c t i o n ,  t h e  l a t t e r  be ing  
more o f  an  a b s t r a c t  concept  t han  t h e  former. A l i n k  between 
s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  agg rega t ion  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
p r e f e r e n c e s ,  and a  r e q u i r e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of income should be 
sough t .  
S tandard  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  has  been a  widely u s e d t o o l  
i n  p l ann ing .  However, it has  i t s  shortcomings,  a s  can  be shown 
by t h e  fo l lowing  example: 
Consider  t h e  c a s e  of a  r i v e r  t h a t  can o n l y  be c ros sed  by 
b o a t ,  a t  t h e  p r i c e  p e r  c r o s s i n g  of 20 u n i t s  of some cur rency .  
The p r o f i t  pe r  c r o s s i n g  t o  t h e  boa t  company i s  5 u n i t s ,  t h e  
number of  c r o s s i n g s  i n  a  g iven  p e r i o d  i s  5000. The q u e s t i o n  
under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  would it pay t o  b u i l d  a  b r i d g e  a c r o s s  
t h e  r i v e r ?  The c o s t  of  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  b r idge  i s  e s t i m a t e d  
a t  3  m i l l i o n  u n i t s ,  which can  be  f inanced  (assuming a  p e r f e c t  
c a p i t a l  market)  a t  t h e  r a t e  of  101, i . e . ,  i n t e r e s t  payment of  
300,000 p e r  pe r iod .  The b r i d a e  i s  expected t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
number of  c r o s s i n g s  t o  20,000 c r o s s i n g s  pe r  p e r i o d  i f  t h e  p r i c e  
of us ing  t h e  b r i d g e  i s  zero .  
Applying t h e  Marsha l l  c o n d i t i o n  (consumer s u r p l u s ) ,  t h e  
answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  whether t h e  b r idge  should be b u i l t  i s  
n e g a t i v e  : 
2 0 P 
Price 
Area A represents the net benefit to consumers. 
Consumer benefit: + 150,000 
Reduction in private profits: - 25,000 
Increase in taxes: 
(Interest on loan) 
Net benefit to society: 
The solution is derived by using separable preference func- 
tions. No consideration is given to the distributive aspects, 
i.e., who gains and who loses from the project. 
One way of taking into account distributive goals is to 
attach weights to the social welfare function as such: if 
{kilm is the desired distribution of income, the social welfare 
i=l 
function could plausibly be written as W = W(AiUi, ..., AmUm), 
where the As are different weights attached to the utilities of 
different groups or individuals. This raises the question of 
the relationship between the p and A vectors. 
There is in general no simple relationship between the 
weight of individual utilities in the social welfare function 
and the share of each agent in total income. There are two rea- 
sons for this. First, an equilibrium associated with a given 
distribution of income cannot be guaranteed to be unique. Se- 
condly, it is not easy to define a social welfare function, 
since it is only meaningful for a given cardinal specification 
of individual utility functions. For a more formal treatment 
of these issues the reader is referred to [5]. 
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DISCUSSION 
Bell made two remarks, one concerning externalities andthe 
other about the concept of basic needs. He thought that although 
it is analytically difficult, one should consider externalities 
in consumption (conspicuous consumption), especially in stratified 
societies. In developing economies the concept of basic needs 
is often used. This notion can be extended to studies of the 
planning process, where one has to take into consideration that 
no utility index for the society can be constructed if an indi- 
vidual is denied a basic bundle of goods. The standard neoclas- 
sical literature on utility ignores both externalities andbasic 
needs. 
Milleron agreed that the problem of needs is very important, 
and pointed to one technical difficulty that can arise in connec- 
tion with the consumption set: there can be differential equa- 
tions that contain discontinuities on the right hand side. 
Porwit pointed out that there is a problem in deciding on 
the weights in the social welfare function, especially if one 
looks into the future. In the short term one is concerned with 
needs, but in the long term the issue of restructuring society 
is predominant, and might distort our view of present needs. 
A second problem in the planning process is that one must 
be concerned with the relative benefits of alternative projects 
financed out of a specified fund. 
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL PROBLEMS IN DYNAMIC 
ECONOMIC PLANNING 
K. Porwit 
This contribution attempts to explore the role of long-term 
economic planning as a process of control over the economic sys- 
tem. Thus, one cannot rely on any general rules developed from 
experience, but must venture to formulate hypotheses on the pos- 
sible future evolution of the control process. 
The aim of long-term planning is to progressively narrow 
the discrepancy between social needs and social resources to 
fulfill these needs. The concept of planning is dynamic, since 
social needs are not constant over time but vary with changes 
in their perception and formulation. 
The procedure for formulating and implementing plans is 
greatly influenced by the type of socioeconomic system under 
consideration. The discussion below is derived mainly from the 
author's experience of problems in socialist countries, but it 
is general enough to encompass problems of planning in other 
systems. Briefly, the basic features of a socialist system are 
(a) public ownership of the means of production, and (b) active 
participation of the population in decision making at all levels. 
The second feature is at least as important as the first for 
considerations of planning and control processes. 
The issues that have to be resolved by long-term planning 
are considered in four consecutive stages. The first is the 
specification of certain social needs--e.g., in health, in edu- 
cation, in future consumption of certain commodities--and the 
identification of a "social utility function." The problems 
faced at this stage are complex; societal issues are by their 
very nature multidimensional. In addition to identifying social 
needs, one must be able to rank them in order of priority (or 
urgency) and to determine the prospective beneficiaries. The 
decision-making process involving multiple and heterogeneous 
needs is sociopolitical and not purely economic in nature, 
dealing as it does with trade-offs and relations between a range 
of objectives and scarce resources. No uniform methodology 
exists to deal with such problems. It is customary to use social 
indicators in this context. 
The next stage is to translate these social needs into the 
language of final consumption demand. In central planning sys- 
tems practicable plans have to be specified at the aggregate 
macrolevel, at the sectoral level, and at the microlevel of 
individual enterprises. This involves using procedures that 
include branchwise, regional, and problem-solving-oriented 
approaches. An important feature of this stage is related to 
the internalization of social objectives into sectoral goals. 
In general, quantification is easier here than at the first stage, 
although in linking motivations to sectoral goals, numerous and 
not always easily quantifiable aspects have to be considered. 
At this level the feasibility of certain plans over a given time 
horizon is considered. To what extent is it economically and 
socially possible to narrow the gap between needs and constraints? 
Technological considerations, related to gestation lags (or imple- 
mentation cycles), also play an important role in formulating 
plans. 
In stages 1 and 2 the question of who is involved in the 
decision-making process is essential. It is necessary for mem- 
bers of the working population to participate in defining the 
social needs and the ultimate pattern of use and distribution 
of the fruits of planning. Here a distinction must be made be- 
tween the concept of central planning, seen in a wide societal 
context of participation, and that of planning at the central 
level of an administrative hierarchy, whereby the latter is just 
one element of the former. 
The third stage in the long-term planning process involves 
evaluation of the plans. Here the monetary unit, although the 
most common means of measurement, is most inadequate. This is 
most evident in the evaluation of social phenomena--such as so- 
cial change--and of social services. Even at the level of eco- 
nomic processes per se, e.g., production, it is still far from 
ideal. In a socialist economic system the enterprises are 
socioeconomic entities. The motivation and attitudes of people 
working in them certainly have sociopolitical implications and 
affect the planning process and the success of implementation. 
These shortcomings in measurement and evaluation lead to prob- 
lems of communication between planning experts (using their 
special terminology) and representatives of society (reflecting 
sociopolitical considerations) and the working people whosemoti- 
vation and collaboration are essential to the economic success 
of the enterprise [ I ] .  However, given the fact that, at present, 
no other feasible mechanism exists, monetary units of measurement 
(prices) and synthetic indicators of performance (such as profit 
or value added) are widely used. 
The final stage is to apply a mixture of different control 
rules to development processes. The mixture depends upon many 
factors such as the duration of a plan or the linkages that exist 
within sectors. For example, in the case of investment proces- 
ses one can make the following rough distinctions: 
- Long-termprograms, with far-reaching implementation 
cycles and many interbranch implications, which are best 
tackled directly within the central planning framework; 
- Adaptive investments, with shorter gestation periods, 
but still having interbranch repercussions--here, it is 
necessary to enrich central planning procedures with an 
ex ante consideration of expected future conditions; 
- Intrabranch adaptive processes that can be regulated at 
the microlevel by means of economic instruments of con- 
trol. 
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DISCUSSION 
Klein asked the following questions: In centrally planned 
economies are long-term plans considered as an intellectual 
luxury? How do planners communicate with the government? Do 
governments understand the limitations of technology, methodology, 
etc.? 
Porwit answered that plans are a necessity for all nonrou- 
tine decisions and that the problems of communication between 
the microlevel and macrolevel cause difficulties within long- 
term planning. The problems of communication indicate the need 
to improve the common language not only between experts and 
society but also within the planning body. 
Nagy discussed another aspect of long-term planning. In 
the future the degree of freedom in planning will increase, but 
if the models are too specific, this freedom will be lost. Also 
if one cannot change the parameters, the plan will be devalued. 
Therefore the planning process has to be democratized. 
Bell agreed that money indicators would eliminate many 
alternative possibilities from discussion. This situation could 
be observed in lesser developed countries at the present time. 
He felt that cost-benefit analysts often do not take into account 
important structural and other changes in the economy. 
Mitra referred to the recommendations of the two principal 
works on the subject (UNIDO and OECD manuals), which recommended 
that accounting prices be derived from an aggregated macroeco- 
nomic planning model that took into consideration expected struc- 
tural changes. The planning model was used to calculate shadow 
wage rates (SWR), accounting rates of interest (ARI), and other 
summary statistics, which would then allow a project authority 
to develop a system of accounting prices. This was the decen- 
tralization scheme underlying the manuals. It fell short of a 
g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  system, because p l ann ing  a t  t h e  p r o j e c t  l e v e l  
o f t e n  was no t  f e d  back t o  modify t h e  c e n t r a l l y  de r ived  e s t i m a t e s  
of  t h e  SWR and A R I .  The reason  was n o t  t h a t  c o s t - b e n e f i t  ana- 
l y s t s  were i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  aware o f  t h e  need t o  develop  a  cons i s -  
t e n t  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  system, b u t  t h a t  t h e  i n fo rma t iona l  and 
communication d i f f i c u l t i e s  of implementing a  feedback system 
were cons ide rab l e .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  summary s t a t i s t i c s  c e n t r a l  
t o  p r o j e c t  e v a l u a t i o n  had t o  be d e r i v e d  from p e r s p e c t i v e  long- 
term p lanning  models b e l i e d  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  c o s t - b e n e f i t  ana ly-  
sis ignored  s t r u c t u r a l  economic changes .  He agreed  t h a t  it was 
impor t an t  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  domain of  c o s t - b e n e f i t  
a n a l y s i s ,  and hence t o  r e s i s t  t h e  t empta t ion  of  u s ing  account ing  
p r i c e s  t o  e v a l u a t e  every a l t e r n a t i v e .  
Porwi t  remarked t h a t  t h e  use  of accoun t ing  p r i c e s  i s  q u i t e  
r e l e v a n t  f o r  r e s o u r c e s  and technology c h o i c e s ,  whereas it would 
n o t  a l low f o r  f i n d i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  o b j e c t i v e  p a t t e r n s ,  e - g . ,  
needs could  ha rd ly  be d e s c r i b e d  by p r i c e s .  
Ar thu r  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  a r i s e  when h i e r -  
a r c h i c a l l y  o rgan ized  p l a n s  have t o  d e a l  wi th  s t r u c t u r a l  changes.  
He sugges ted  inc reased  d i a logue  between t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p l ann ing  
l e v e  1s. 
Shesh insk i  observed t h a t  t h e  decision-making r u l e s  appea r ing  
i n  t h e  r e c e n t  l i t e r a t u r e  on p lanning  and "second b e s t "  w e l f a r e  
economics were compl ica ted ,  and t h e i r  implementat ion r e q u i r e d  
much in fo rma t ion  abou t  t h e  economy. He sugges ted  t h e  u se  of  
approximation models and s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a l y s i s  t o  d e r i v e  s imple  
r u l e s  f o r  d e c i s i o n  making. 
M i t r a  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  t empta t ion  t o  d e r i v e  s imple  r u l e s  
from models could  l e a d  t o  t h e  overimplementat ion of  t h e s e  r u l e s ,  
and s o  S h e s h i n s k i ' s  sugges t ion  should  be approached c a u t i o u s l y .  
Fur thermore ,  t h e  models used by economic t h e o r i s t s  were d e l i b -  
e r a t e l y  chosen f o r  t h e i r  s i m p l i c i t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  i s o l a t e  t h o s e  
i s s u e s  adjudged t o  be impor tan t  i n  a  s p e c i f i c  c o n t e x t .  He 
doubted t h a t  r u l e s  d e r i v e d  from a  f u r t h e r  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  of such  
models would prove u s e f u l  i n  p o l i c y  making. 
Weiss mentioned t h a t  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  f o r  example, it 
was neces sa ry  f o r  p l anne r s  t o  ba lance  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  r e -  
p r e sen ted  by l o b b i e s .  He thought  it would be  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  
d i s c o v e r  what p a r t i c u l a r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  would a r i s e  from an a t t empt  
t o  implement a  Ramsey-type t a x  r u l e .  
Tardos s a i d  t h a t  a  concern wi th  op t imiz ing  d e c i s i o n s  was 
probably  n o t  a p p r o p r i a t e .  Lobbies o f t e n  d i s t o r t  account ing  
p r i c e s  i n  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s .  He f e l t  t h a t  shadow p r i c e s  and 
o t h e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  p r i c e s  had a  weak s t a t i s t i c a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  
base .  

11. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY PROBLEMS 





The interaction between various distributional instruments 
and their consequences can be analyzed within the framework of 
the following matrix. 
Direct Taxes + Regula- Incentive 
allocations subsidies tions schemes 
Sectoral distribution 









There are, of course, many linkages between the above dis- 
tributions. For example, a taxation policy that has the effect 
of increasing equality today might affect the growth of the cap- 
ital stock, and thus exert some influence on intergenerational 
distribution, so that individual size distribution may affect 
intertemporal distribution. 
POSSIBLE RESEARCH AREAS 
Sectoral Distribution: Between the Urban and Rural 
Sectors in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) 
Here one might be faced with a problem of possible trade- 
offs between distributional and efficiency targets. This 
problem has a long history in the literature. At first it was 
thought that the development of the urban manufacturing sector 
would be the motor force for growth. Later, the opposite view, 
the importance of developing the rural sector, became dominant. 
Depending on the model under consideration, different conclu- 
sions can be reached about the effect of sectoral distribution 
policies. Using one particular model it is claimed that there 
is no trade-off between efficiency and growth. The argument is 
that the capital stock in the rural sector is smaller than in 
the urban sector; thus it can be assumed that the marginal prod- 
uct of capital, being greater in the rural sector, would leadto 
both more growth and a greater degree of equality, since a dis- 
tortion caused by imperfections in the capital market is being 
countered. 
On the other hand, some economists maintain that there is 
a trade-off between growth and efficiency targets. By increasing 
rural income one would simply encourage more migration to urban 
centers, assuming that migration is positively related to the 
possession of capital, or the means to support oneself before 
finding a job in the urban sector. This aid to the rural sector 
would not promote efficiency--rural output would not increase-- 
and it would have minimal effects on inequality, mainly an in- 
crease in unemployment in the urban sector. This view reflects 
the nature of the limited control on labor allocation between 
rural and urban sectors in LDCs. 
Human Capital versus the Screening Theory of Education 
There are two views about the function that education per- 
forms in society: it either increases productivity, or it serves 
to identify abilities (or both). In the case where the market 
provides imperfect information about individual abilities, and 
when this information is itself endogenous, then a screening 
view of education (as opposed to the human capital view) con- 
cludes that an equilibrium position is no longer Pareto optimal. 
It can be shown, under some specific conditions, that the net 
national income (net of the costs of screening) is lower as a 
result of screening, and y-distribution is more depressed, i-e., 
there is no trade-off between distributional and efficiencytar- 
gets. However, these conditions are not fully explored in the 
literature, and one cannot determine whether this would be a 
normal or an exceptional case. 
There are two types of screening: hierarchical screening, 
which attempts to differentiate total abilities; and comparative 
advantage screening, which identifies different individuals' 
comparative advantages. The latter raises the productivity of 
the economy by increasing the efficiency of resource allocation, 
while the former leads to greater inequality, but no improvement 
in allocation efficiency by allowing individuals to get their 
ability rents. 
A t  t h i s  p o i n t  one shou ld  n o t e  t h a t  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  e d u c a t i o n ,  
s o c i a l  r e t u r n s  c an  d i f f e r  wide ly  from p r i v a t e  r e t u r n s ;  t h i s  i s  
e v i d e n t  i n  some LDCs. I f  e d u c a t i o n  i s  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  employ- 
ment,  s k i l l e d  l a b o r  w i l l  be appo in t ed  t o  jobs  f o r  which u n s k i l l e d  
l a b o r  would have q u a l i f i e d ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  where t h e  number o f w o r k -  
ers exceed  t h e  j obs  o f f e r e d .  Thus, t h e  p r i v a t e  demand f o r  educa- 
t i o n  i s  h i g h ,  and t h e  p r i v a t e  r e t u r n  t o  e d u c a t i o n  is n o t  o n l y  
p o s i t i v e ,  b u t  i n c r e a s e s  a s  more e d u c a t i o n  i s  s u p p l i e d .  However, 
t h e  s o c i a l  r e t u r n  ( i n c r e a s e  t o  s o c i a l  p r o d u c t )  is  n i l .  
The q u e s t i o n  t o  be c o n s i d e r e d  h e r e  i s  whether  t h e r e  is  any 
economic argument f o r  a p p l y i n g  a  p a r t i c u l a r  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  i n  
s o c i a l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s .  S i n c e  t h e  need f o r  c o s t - b e n e f i t  
a n a l y s i s  a r i s e s  p r e c i s e l y  under  c i r cums t ances  i n  which marke ts  
a r e  i m p e r f e c t ,  and i n  which t h e  government can  e x e r c i s e - o n l y  a  l i m -  
i t e d  deg ree  o f  c o n t r o l ,  t h e  answer depends on t h e  way t h o s e  
p a r t i c u l a r  f e a t u r e s  a r e  modeled. T h i s  p o i n t  c a n  be i l l u s t r a t e d  
by r e f e r r i n g  t o  a  s imp le  model. (A d e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  
model,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a  complete  s t a t e m e n t  o f  r e s u l t s  and p r o o f s  
a r e  t o  be found i n  S t i g l i t z ,  J . E . ,  The S o c i a l  R a t e  o f  Time P r e f -  
e r e n c e  and t h e  Ra t e  o f  Discount  f o r  C os t  B e n e f i t  Analys i s , ,Mimeo,  
1977 . )  I n d i v i d u a l s  l i v e  f o r  two p e r i o d s ,  hav ing  a  wage, wJ, i n  
t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d ,  s av ing  t h e  r ema inde r ,  r e c e i v i n g  an  i n t e r e s t  
r e t u r n  of  r on t h e i r  i nves tm en t ,  and consuming t h e i r  c a p i t a l  
( i n c l u d i n g  i n t e r e s t ) .  i n  t h e  second p e r i o d .  I f  t h e r e  i s  wage and 
c a p i t a l  t a x a t i o n ,  wJ and r a r e  p o s t - t a x  r e t u r n s .  I n d i v i d u a l  wel- 
f a r e  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a n  i n d i r e c t  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  u j  (wJ  , r ,  I])  , 
g i v i n g  u t i l i t y  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  wage, t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  
and any lump sum income ( o r  t a x )  r e c e i v e d .  
S o c i a l  w e l f a r e  is  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a  Benthamite  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  
f u n c t i o n ,  w = C t ( C  . u 3 )  1  
t r  where t h e  s u b s c r i p t  t r e p r e s e n t s  (1 + 6 )  
t h e  d a t e  a t  which t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  bo r n ,  and 6  ( > 0 )  i s  a  guaran-  
t e e d  d i s c o m t  f a c t o r .  For  s i m p l i c i t y ,  t h e r e  i s  no p o p u l a t i o n  
growth.  
P  9  There  i s  an a g g r e g a t e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n ,  Qt = F(K ,K , L t ) ,  
where t t  
Q = a g g r e g a t e  o u t p u t  = sum of  consumption ( c )  and 
i nves tmen t  ( A K ~  + A K ~ )  , 
KP = p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l ,  
Kg = p u b l i c  c a p i t a l ,  
L = agg rega t e  l a b o r ,  
P r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  and l a b o r  s u p p l i e d  w i l l  depend on i n d i v i d u a l  
d e c i s i o n s ,  i . e . ,  on consumer p r i c e s  and  incomes. The amount of 
p u b l i c  c a p i t a l  s u p p l i e d  i s  c o n s t r a i n e d  by t h e  t a x  revenues  of  
t h e  government.  The o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  government i s  t o  f i n d  a  
set  o f  t a x e s  ( o r  i n t e r e s t  and wages) a t  each  d a t e ,  and a  pro-  
gram of  i nves tmen t  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  good t h a t  i s  f e a s i b l e  and t h a t  
maximizes s o c i a l  w e l f a r e .  
T h i s  model can  be used t o  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  be- 
tween t h e  s o c i a l  r a t e  o f  t i m e  d i s c o u n t ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  pu r e  t ime  
p r e f e r e n c e ,  and t h e  marg ina l  p r o d u c t  o f  c a p i t a l  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r ,  depend on t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  between workers  and c a p i t a l -  
i s t s  o f  t h e  r e n t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c  c a p i t a l  good,  and 
on t h e  set of i n s t r u m e n t s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  government.  Thus,  
w i t h  lump sum t a x a t i o n ,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  r a t e  o f  d i s -  
c o u n t  (F2)  e q u a l s  t h e  mar g ina l  p r oduc t  of c a p i t a l  (F1 ) , i . e .  , 
p r o d u c t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  d e s i r a b l e .  T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  no l o n g e r  
h o l d s  i n  t h e  absence  of lump sum t a x a t i o n .  Suppose t h a t  some 
of  t h e  p u b l i c  c a p i t a l  good augments t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  of workers ,  
w h i l e  t h e  rest i s  a p p r o p r i a t e d  by c a p i t a l i s t s .  I f  t h e  govern-  
ment ha s  comple te  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  s e t  o f  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  imposed, 
it can  be shown t h a t  i n  s t e a d y  s t a t e  t h e  s o c i a l  r a t e  o f  d i s c o u n t  
(F2)  e q u a l s  t h e  p u r e  r a t e  of s o c i a l  t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e s  (1 + 6 ) .  
However, t h e r e  w i l l  be i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  on c a p i t a l ,  and t h e  
marg ina l  p r o d u c t  o f  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  (F1)  w i l l  n o t  e q u a l  t h e  so- 
c i a l  r a t e  o f  d i s c o u n t  (F2)  , v i o l a t i n g  p r o d u c t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y .  I f ,  
however,  we change t h e  unde r ly ing  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  assumpt ion ,  d i f -  
f e r e n t  c o n c l u s i o n s  fo l l ow .  Suppose t h a t  c a p i t a l  and l a b o r  a r e  
p a i d  t h e i r  ma rg ina l  p r o d u c t s ,  b u t  t h a t ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t h e r e  a r e  
r e n t s  a c c r u i n g  t o  t h e  owner o f  f i r m s .  There  i s  a  marke t  f o r  t h e  
e q u i t y  of f i r m s ,  and t h e  p r i c e  o f  t h e  e q u i t y  must be  a d j u s t e d  s o  
t h a t  t h e  r e t u r n  from h o l d i n g  e q u i t y  is j u s t  e q u a l  t o  t h e  r e n t  
from owning c a p i t a l .  I f  t h e  government c anno t  d i s t i n g u i s h  be- 
tween pu re  e q u i t y  ( r e n t s )  and c a p i t a l  f o r  t a x  pu r pos e s ,  t h e n  
t h e  s o c i a l  r a t e  of d i s c o u n t  (F2)  a lways  l ies  between t h e  pu r e  
r a t e  o f  t i m e  d i s c o u n t  (1 + 6)  and t h e  p r i v a t e  r e t u r n  t o  c a p i t a l  
( F i ) .  
U n c e r t a i n t y  
The problem of  u n c e r t a i n t y  h a s  been d e a l t  w i t h  i n  t h e  lit- 
e r a t u r e  by means of  two s t a n d a r d  procedures :  
- By app ly ing  a  h i g h e r  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  of  
u n c e r t a i n t y - - t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h i s  method i s  t h a t  it 
c o n f u s e s  an i n t e r t e m p o r a l  p r i c e  w i t h  an  u n c e r t a i n t y  p r i c e ;  
- By u s i n g  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n c e s ,  which would seem t o  be 
a  c o r r e c t  app roach - - p r o j ec t s  s hou ld  be e v a l u a t e d  by 
u s i n g  t h e  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  of a  random pay-off 
tomorrow and t h e n  by d i s c o u n t i n g  it a t  t h e  s o c i a l  r a t e  
of  d i s c o u n t .  
Nature  o f  Techno log i ca l  Change and I ts  E f f e c t  
on t h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  Economy 
The r a t e  and d i r e c t i o n  o f  t e c h n i c a l  change show a  number o f  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  can  be p a r t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by p l ann ing .  R e -  
s e a r c h  can  be viewed a s  an ex t reme v a l u e  s t a t i s t i c ;  it i s  a  
s e a r c h  f o r  b e t t e r  ways of  d o ing  t h i n g s  where, o u t  o f  a  l a r g e  
number of expe r imen t s ,  t h e  o n l y  r e l e v a n t  one i s  t h e  b e s t .  The 
mean r a t e  o f  t e c h n i c a l  p r o g r e s s  is  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  r i s k  involved  
i n  t h e  r e s e a r c h :  t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  v a r i a n c e ,  i - e . ,  r i s k ,  t h e  f a s t e r  
t h e  t e c h n i c a l  p r o g r e s s ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  v a r i a n c e  of i n -  
come, s i n c e  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  r i c h l y  rewarded f o r  s u c c e s s f u l r e s u l t s .  
I t  can  be a rgued  t h a t  t h e  market  economy does  n o t  unde r t ake  re- 
s e a r c h  w i t h  a  h igh  l e v e l  of r i s k ,  and t h e r e f o r e  government p o l i -  
c i e s  shou ld  be d e v i s e d  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  and t h e  r e s u l t -  
i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income. 
T e c h n i c a l  change may r e s u l t  i n  a  g r e a t e r  minimum s c a l e  o f  
o u t p u t  and a  lower c o s t  cu r ve .  T h i s  h a s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  compe- 
t i t i o n  i n  t h e  economy, f o r  f a c t o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  f o r  f u r t h e r  re- 
s e a r c h  and development (RBD)  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  and f o r  t h e  pace  o f  
i n n o v a t i o n .  The problem is  t o  f i n d  a n  o p t i m a l  deg r ee  of  compe- 
t i t i o n  i n  t h e  economy. With t o o  much c o m p e t i t i o n ,  p r o f i t s  would 
be low and t o o  few r e s o u r c e s  cou ld  t hen  be a l l o c a t e d  t o  RED. On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand,  an  economy c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  l a c k  o f  compe t i t i on  
g e n e r a t e s  no i n c e n t i v e  f o r  growth and cons equen t l y  f o r  expendi -  
t u r e  on RED. The deg ree  o f  compe t i t i on  i s  i t s e l f  an  endogenous 
v a r i a b l e .  The a l l o c a t i o n  o f  RED r e s o u r c e s  r e q u i r e s  a  c h o i c e  t o  
be made between t h e  market  and t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r ,  b u t  t h e  expe- 
d i e nc y  of  t h e  c h o i c e  can  o n l y  be  s e e n  i n  r e t r o s p e c t .  There  i s  
something t o  be s a i d  f o r  a  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  r e s e a r c h ,  d e s p i t e  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  compe t i t i on  may l e a d  t o  a  d u p l i c a t i o n  of  e f f o r t s .  
Given i m p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  be a b l e  t o  d e s i g n  an 
i n c e n t i v e  scheme of  payment, it i s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  more t h a n  one 
f i r m  t o  unde r t ake  r e s e a r c h .  The payment scheme would t h e n  r e l a t e  
t h e  rewards  of  a  f i r m  n o t  o n l y  t o  i t s  own s u c c e s s  and c o s t s ,  b u t  
a l s o  t o  t h e  performance o f  compet ing f i r m s .  
DISCUSSION 
K l e i n  q u e s t i o n e d  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  e d u c a t i o n  on t h e  l i f e t i m e  
income s t r e am.  I f  one  d i s coun t ed  f u t u r e  e a r n i n g s  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  
it would become c l e a r  t h a t  t o  o b t a i n  a  u n i v e r s i t y  e d u c a t i o n  does  
n o t  pay. 
S t i g l i t z  remarked t h a t  a t  p r e s e n t  one cou ld  n o t  obs e r ve  a  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  number o f  u n i v e r s i t y  s t u d e n t s ,  a l t h o u g h  he 
t h o u g h t  t h a t  a  l agged  r e sp ons e  c o u l d  b e  expec t ed  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  
and one  would have t o  w a i t  and see i f  t h e  number o f  a p p l i c a n t s  
would f a l l  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  he i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  
a  u n i v e r s i t y  e d u c a t i o n  c o u l d  be viewed a s  a  consumption good. 
Dasgupta observed  t h a t  i n  t h e  e a r l y  l i t e r a t u r e  on c o s t -  
b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s ,  one method of  e v a l u a t i n g  p r o j e c t s  was t o  rank  
them acco rd ing  t o  t h e i r  impact  on d i f f e r e n t  p o p u l a t i o n  groups .  
S h e s h i n s k i  added t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  we igh t s  s hou ld  be a s s i g n e d  
s e p a r a t e l y  t o  v a r i o u s  income g r oups ,  a f t e r  de t e r min ing  which 
p o p u l a t i o n  groups  w e r e  b e n e f i t i n g  from a  s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t .  
Turn ing  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  RBD a s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  deg r ee  of  
c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  an  economy, K le in  t hough t  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  a u t h o r -  
i t y  cou ld  always p r o v i d e  funds  t o  c o v e r  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
a c t u a l  and op t ima l  RBD, o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  f i r m s  cou ld  borrow t h e  
ne ce s sa ry  funds  on t h e  c a p i t a l  market .  
Dasgupta r e p l i e d  t h a t  n o t  o n l y  t h e  q u a n t i t y  b u t  a l s o  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  R&D e x p e n d i t u r e  must be t a k e n  i n t o  accoun t .  
H e  added t h a t  o n l y  a  monopoly p o s i t i o n  g i v e s  enough market  power 
f o r  R&D t o  be under taken  by t h e  f i r m .  
S h e s h i n s k i  r a i s e d  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  p r i v a t e  v e r s u s  p u b l i c  
goods: on what grounds c a n  a  g e n e r a l  t h e o r y  be  developed con- 
c e r n i n g  goods t h a t  a r e  b e s t  p rov ided  c o l l e c t i v e l y ?  Economic 
a n a l y s i s  h a s  s o  f a r  p rov ided  no s a t i s f a c t o r y  answer t o  t h i s  
problem. 
M i l l e r o n  asked  about  t h e  k ind  of  i n f o r ma t ion  r e q u i r e d  t o  
a d v i s e  a  government on t h e  c h o i c e  of a  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  f o r  p u b l i c  
i nv es tmen t .  Mi t r a  r e p l i e d  t h a t  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  knowledge of  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n a l  we igh t s ,  it was n e c e s s a r y  t o  have an  i d e a  of  t h e  
s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  between p r i v a t e  and government c a p i t a l  i n  p ro-  
d u c t i o n .  H e  asked  why fo r ma l ly  t h e  Diamond-Mirrlees p r o d u c t i o n  
e f f i c i e n c y  r e s u l t  was n o t  v a l i d .  S t i g l i t z  r e p l i e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  
Diamond-Mirrlees model a l l  goods can be  produced and "consumed" 
b o t h  by t h e  p r i v a t e  and p u b l i c  s e c t o r s .  Here, t h e  p u b l i c  c a p i t a l  
good i s  o n l y  s u p p l i e d  by t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  
good o n l y  by t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  There  i s  no margin by which 
t h e  government c an ,  w i t h i n  i t s  own s p h e r e ,  t r a d e  o f f  a  u n i t  o f  
KP d i r e c t l y  f o r  a  u n i t  o f  Kg. 
INCENTIVE PROBLEMS I N  ECONOMIC PLANNING: 
CASE STUDY OF A  SOCIALIST COUNTRY--HUNGARY 
M. Tardos  
The p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  t o  summarize c u r r e n t  
d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  Hungary a b o u t  problems o f  long- te rm p l a n n i n g  and  
i t s  implementa t ion .  I t  w i l l  c o n c e n t r a t e  on t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  be- 
tween e n t e r p r i s e s  and  t h e  government i n  a  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r y .  
Long-term p l a n n i n g  i s  concerned  w i t h  f o r e c a s t i n g  t h e  f u t u r e  
o f  a  n a t i o n a l  economy. I t  i s  needed t o  d e a l  w i t h  d e c i s i o n s w h o s e  
e f f e c t s  have l o n g  g e s t a t i o n  p e r i o d s ,  e . g . ,  i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n s ,  
and f o r  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  e . g . ,  income d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n .  An i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  i s  t h e  irre- 
v e r s i b i l i t y  o f  most  i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n s ,  e . g . ,  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  
The b a s i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  p a t t e r n  o f  a  s o c i a l i s t  economy i s  
t h e  l a c k  o f  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l .  The means o f  p r o d u c t i o n  a r e  owned 
by t h e  s t a t e ,  complemented by c o o p e r a t i v e  ownersh ip .  
CENTRALIZED PLANNING 
How a r e  r a t i o n a l  economic d e c i s i o n s  made, g i v e n  t h e  h i e r a r -  
c h i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  and  o f  t h e  economy? I n  a  s t r i c t l y  
c e n t r a l i z e d  economy, a s  was Hungary b e f o r e  1 9 6 8 ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  i n  d e c i s i o n  making and t h e  e x t e n t  o f  d e t a i l  i n  
t a r g e t  s e t t i n g  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m s  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s .  The 
i n f o r m a t i o n  f l o w  between t h e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  and t h e  e n t e r -  
p r i s e s  i s  o f t e n  f a r  from o p t i m a l ,  l e a d i n g  t o  i m p e r f e c t  d e c i s i o n  
making. I n  a  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  economy t h e  government would r e s t r i c t  
i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  t h e  s e t t i n g  o f  p r i c e s  f o r  c e n t r a l  r e s o u r c e s  and 
t o  u s e  of  t h e  t a x a t i o n  sys tem.  Shortcomings emerge i n  t h e  two 
t y p e s  of  s y s t e m s .  N e i t h e r  f u n c t i o n s  o p t i m a l l y ,  and it i s  d i f f i -  
c u l t  t o  d e c i d e  which sys tem i s  p r e f e r a b l e .  The d i f f e r e n c e s  be- 
tween them emerge i n  t h e  implementa t ion  o f  economic d e c i s i o n s .  
INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
I n  a  c e n t r a l i z e d  economy d e t a i l e d  t a r g e t s  a r e  set  f o r  t h e  
e n t e r p r i s e s ,  and a l l  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  c e n t r a l l y .  The 
e n t e r p r i s e s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  a d a p t  t o  unexpec ted  changes  i n  t h e  
env i ronment  and t o  o t h e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  f u l f i l l -  
ment o f  t a r g e t s .  
To o b t a i n  s a t i s f a c t o r y  r e s u l t s  two t y p e s  of i n c e n t i v e  s y s -  
t e m s  a r e  used:  t h e  bonus system f o r  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  p l ann ing  
t a r g e t s ,  and t h e  bonus system f o r  any d e c r e a s e  i n  wages and 
o t h e r  f a c t o r  i n p u t s .  The f l aw  i n  t h i s  system i s  t h a t  f i r m s  a r e  
t empted  t o  u n d e r s t a t e  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  t a r g e t  f i g u r e s  t o  g u a r a n t e e  
t a r g e t  f u l f i l l m e n t ,  and,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  t o  avo id  g i v i n g  a c c u r a t e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  p l ann ing  body. To remedy t h i s  s i t u a -  
t i o n ,  it h a s  been sugges t e d  t h a t  an  i n c e n t i v e  sys tem reward ing  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  p l ann ing  t a r g e t s  s hou ld  b e  i n t r o d u c e d .  
Although t h e  p r e s e n t  i n c e n t i v e  system i s  v e r y  d e t a i l e d ,  it 
c a n n o t  hope t o  encompass a l l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e s '  a c t i v -  
i t i es .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  r i g i d i t y  o f  t h e s e  i n c e n t i v e s  does  n o t  
l e a d  t o  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  economic management o f  an e n t e r p r i s e ,  s i n c e  
l i t t l e  s p a c e  remains  f o r  managers t o  manoeuvre and t o  a d j u s t  t o  
env i ronmen ta l  changes.  
Economists  have t h e r e f o r e  proposed m o d i f i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  
p r e s e n t  i n c e n t i v e  system f o r  t a r g e t  p l ann ing .  The e x i s t i n g  sys -  
t e m  i s  s o  compl i ca t ed  t h a t  no manager c an  t a k e  accoun t  of a l l  
i t s  a s p e c t s ,  and d e c i s i o n s  a r e  u s u a l l y  based  on s imp le  r u l e s ,  
i g n o r i n g  a  l a r g e  p a r t  o f  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  s t r u c t u r e .  Thus an  even  
more comprehensive i n c e n t i v e  system would n o t  l e a d  t o  b e t t e r  
management p r a c t i c e s .  
DISADVANTAGES OF THE CENTRALIZED PLANNING SYSTEM 
Although t h i s  t y p e  of  system can  o f t e n  g e n e r a t e  r a p i d g r o w t h ,  
it h a s  many drawbacks--the p r i n c i p a l  one be ing  t h a t  e f f i c i e n c y  
i s  ve ry  low. F a c t o r  i n p u t s  a r e  h igh ,  and a d a p t a b i l i t y  t o r e q u i r e -  
ments  on t h e  demand s i d e  a r e  s ubop t ima l ,  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e a -  
s on s :  
- Environmental  changes a r e  ve r y  r a p i d .  
- F o r e c a s t i n g  of  t h e s e  changes i s  u s u a l l y  i n a c c u r a t e .  
- The s t a t i c  n a t u r e  o f  t a r g e t  p l ann ing  does  n o t  a l l o w  a  
smooth adap t i on  t o  t h e s e  changes .  
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Improvements i n  e f f i c i e n c y  can be ach i eved  by a b o l i s h i n g  
t h e  sys tem of  c e n t r a l i z e d  t a r g e t  p l a n n i n g ,  and by p r ov id ing  
e n t e r p r i s e s  w i t h  more g e n e r a l  t a r g e t s .  I n  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s  
s e c t o r  t h e r e  i s  no need t o  d i c t a t e  s p e c i f i c  t a r g e t s  t o  t h e  i n d i -  
v i d u a l  u n i t s ,  e . g . ,  s c h o o l s ,  h o s p i t a l s ,  s i n c e  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  
a r e  w e l l  d e f i n e d ,  and s o  each  u n i t  would be a b l e  t o  set  i t s  own 
t a r g e t s .  
I n  t h e  compe t i t i ve  s e c t o r ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, g e n e r a l  aims 
must be s p e c i f i e d .  The s o c i a l  goa l  would be t o  i n c r e a s e  p r o f i t  
a b i l i t y .  I t  must n o t  be ignored  t h a t  p r o f i t s  do n o t  g i v e  o p t i -  
mal guidance t o  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  u n i t s ,  b u t  a  b e t t e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  
system of succes s  i n d i c a t o r s  does  n o t  e x i s t .  Adoption of t h e  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  aim, does  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  govern- 
ment should  n o t  i n t e r f e r e  i n  economic a c t i v i t i e s .  C e n t r a l  guid-  
ance must be provided ,  b u t  it must be of  t h e  same n a t u r e  and t o  
t h e  same e x t e n t  f o r  a l l  f i rms .  Decen t r a l i zed  u n i t s  should  be 
g iven  t h e  p r i c e s ,  and they  should  t h e n  a t t e m p t  t o  adap t  t h e i r  
p l a n s  t o  maximize p r o f i t s .  S t a t e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  
e n t e r p r i s e s ,  e - g . ,  s p e c i f i c  s u b s i d i e s  o r  exemptions,  a r e  t o  be 
avoided.  I f  t h e  government i n t e r f e r e s  t o  e q u a l i z e  p r o f i t s ,  
t h e r e  e x i s t s  t h e  danger  t h a t  f i r m s  w i l l  r e l a x  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  
improve performance, s i n c e  lower t han  average  p r o f i t s  make f i r m s  
l i a b l e  t o  government a s s i s t a n c e .  
The Hungarian expe r i ence  shows t h a t  it i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
a b o l i s h  t a r g e t  p lanning .  An i n s t i t u t i o n a l  reform i s  a l s o  neces- 
s a r y  t o  a b o l i s h  t h e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  d e c i s i o n  making. 
A p l u r a l i s t i c  system of  d e c i s i o n  making can  be  e s t a b l i s h e d  with-  
o u t  d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  economy. There would s t i l l  be no 
p r i v a t e  ownership o f  t h e  means of  product ion ,  b u t  a  system o f  
"ho ld ing  banks" would f u l f i l l  t h e  f u n c t i o n  of  c a p i t a l  ownership 
i n  t h e  compe t i t i ve  s e c t o r .  
Which a c t i v i t i e s  should  be c a r r i e d  o u t  by t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  
and which by t h e  compe t i t i ve  s e c t o r  i s  n o t  determined by economic 
f a c t o r s  a l o n e  b u t  a l s o  by p o l i t i c a l  and h i s t o r i c  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  
Th i s  q u e s t i o n  can  be approached from an economic v iewpoin t  i n  
two ways: 
- When changes i n  t h e  environment a r e  r a p i d ,  and f o r e -  
c a s t i n g  is  weak, t h e  branches  a f f e c t e d  by t h e s e  f a c t o r s  
should  be c o n t r o l l e d  by independent ,  autonomous u n i t s ,  
e . g . ,  i n d u s t r y ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and t r a d e .  I n  
t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  
system would n o t  impede e f f i c i e n c y .  
- Each s o c i a l  system can  dec ide  which b a s i c  p roduc t s  and 
s e r v i c e s  must be supp l i ed  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  These i n c l u d e  
goods and s e r v i c e s  whose p r o v i s i o n  and e q u a l  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  i s  more impor tan t  t h a n  e f f i c i e n c y ,  e . g . ,  h e a l t h ,  
educa t ion .  Furthermore,  t h e  government can  always 
i n t e r v e n e  i n  impor tan t  a r e a s  of p roduc t ion ,  e . g . ,  energy 
and raw m a t e r i a l s  p roduc t ion ,  where r e s o u r c e s  must be 
guaranteed  f o r  every  consumer. I n  t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
economies of  s c a l e  a r e  ve ry  impor t an t ,  t h u s  it may be 
concluded t h a t  l a r g e ,  perhaps  unique ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a r e  
op t ima l .  
DISCUSSION 
Shesh insk i  asked Tardos why he had inc luded  i n t e r m e d i a t e  
goods i n  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r ,  t o g e t h e r  w i th  h e a l t h  and educa t ion .  
Only f o r  educa t ion  could one a g r e e  t h a t ,  f o r  e q u i t y  r ea sons ,  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  might n o t  be i d e a l .  Tardos commented t h a t  e q u i t y  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  were no t  t h e  on ly  c r i t e r i a ;  he t h e n  ana lyzed  t h e  
p u b l i c  h e a l t h  system i n  Hungary, where t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  pay- 
ments by p a t i e n t s  t o  p h y s i c i a n s  may prove t o  be  a  b e t t e r  s o l u t i o n  
than  t h e  p r e s e n t  i l l e g a l  t i p p i n g .  Dasgupta r a i s e d  many p o i n t s :  
F i r s t ,  he s a i d  i n  some c a s e s  t h e  government may have t o  i n t e r -  
vene t o  ensu re  t h e  supply  of  c e r t a i n  commodities w i thou t  a c t u a l l y  
producing  them, product ion  be ing  l e f t  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  
Secondly,  he r a i s e d  doubts  about  t h e  u se  of  " d i f f i c u l t y  o f  fo re -  
c a s t i n g "  c r i t e r i a  f o r  dec id ing  on t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of  goods t o  be 
produced e i t h e r  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  o r  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r .  I n  a g r i -  
c u l t u r e  one must ensu re  a g a i n s t  e x c e s s i v e  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i f  
t h e  p r i v a t e  system i s  t o  gua ran t ee  a  d e s i r e d  ou tpu t .  T h i r d l y ,  
he ag reed  wi th  Tardos t h a t  inves tment  i n  t h e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  was 
b e t t e r  l e f t  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  where c a p a c i t y  can b e s t  be ex- 
panded i n  c e r t a i n  d i s c r e t e  u n i t s ,  because of  t h e  importance of  
i n c r e a s i n g  r e t u r n s  t o  s c a l e .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  p r i c e s  a r e  n o t  a v e r y  
u s e f u l  mechanism f o r  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of  inves tment .  Also ,  s i n c e  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a r e  l i m i t e d ,  and p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  
i s  imposs ib l e  t o  ach i eve ,  p r i c e s  may n o t  be t h e  b e s t  means of 
s o l v i n g  s t r u c t u r a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  problems,  and t h e r e  i s  a  b i a s  
towards t h e  use o f  q u a n t i t y  c o n t r o l s .  Fou r th ly ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
r a t h e r  t h a n  e q u i t y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  may p l a y  a  r o l e  i n  t h e  provi -  
s i o n  of  c e r t a i n  b a s i c  s e r v i c e s  by t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r ,  e . g . ,  inoc-  
u l a t i o n .  L a s t l y ,  Dasgupta mentioned two t h e o r e t i c a l  views about  
t h e  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of  inves tment  d e c i s i o n s ,  l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  cen- 
t r a l i z a t i o n  of  d e c i s i o n  making: i f  one r e l i e s  on t h e  p r i c e  sys-  
tem when making p lanning  d e c i s i o n s ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be a  tendency t o  
o v e r i n v e s t  i f  one t r i e s  t o  r each  an  optimum p o s i t i o n ;  owing t o  
u n c e r t a i n t y ,  and i f  t h e  i n v e s t o r  i s  r i s k  n e u t r a l ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  
of p r i c e  system might r e s u l t  i n  over inves tment ,  i n  t h e  s ense  
t h a t  one cannot  r e v e r s e  inves tment  d e c i s i o n s ,  and t h u s ,  f l e x i -  
b i l i t y  may be l o s t .  
B e l l  r a i s e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how c o o r d i n a t i o n  between t h e  
c o m p e t i t i v e  and s o c i a l i s t  s e c t o r s  can  be achieved ,  s i n c e  some 
Keynesian unemployment of  l a b o r  might  r e s u l t  from such a  system. 
He asked  whether nominal p r i c e s  a r e  r e a l l y  f i x e d .  I f  t h e y  a r e  
f i x e d ,  t h e  government might r e s o r t  e i t h e r  t o  g i v i n g  q u a n t i t y  
i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  o r  t o  buying t h e  o u t p u t  i n  o r d e r  t o  i n s u r e  s u f f i -  
c i e n t  e f f e c t i v e  demand. 
Tardos responded t o  Dasgupta ' s  q u e s t i o n s  by say ing  t h a t  t h e  
models of  i n c e n t i v e s  do  n o t  d e a l  w i th  e f f o r t  i n  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
manner; he agreed  t h a t  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  where u n c e r t a i n t y  of  i n -  
come may be very  g r e a t ,  some e q u a l i z a t i o n  of  income should  be 
i n t roduced .  A system of  minimum p r i c i n g  i n  a  market t y p e  of  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  may prove t o  be a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n .  Tardos 
a g r e e d  w i t h  B e l l  t h a t  some Keynesian t y p e  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  may be 
n e c e s s a r y .  The government i s  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  c a r r y  o u t  a n t i c y -  
c l i c a l  p o l i c i e s  i n  a  s o c i a l i s t  t h a n  i n  a  marke t  economy. 
K l e i n  a s k e d  how p r i c e s  were d e t e r m i n e d  i n  a  c e n t r a l l y  
p lanned  economy, and how o v e r a l l  l e v e l s  o f  g rowth ,  c a p i t a l  f o r -  
m u l a t i o n ,  a n d  o t h e r  a g g r e g a t e  d e c i s i o n s  were c o o r d i n a t e d  w i t h  
p l a n n i n g  a t  t h e  m i c r o l e v e l .  Tardos  commented t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  
need f o r  a  f r e e r  sys tem o f  p r i c i n g  i n  Hungary, i . e . ,  t h e  u s e  of  
m a r k e t  f e e d b a c k ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  some commodit ies  s h o u l d  
s t i l l  be c e n t r a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d .  
K l e i n  t h e n  i n q u i r e d  whe ther  t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker a t  t h e  e n t e r -  
p r i s e  l e v e l  had a c c e s s  t o  l o a n s ,  t o  which Tardos  r e p l i e d  p o s i -  
t i v e l y :  l o a n s ,  b a s e d  on p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c r i t e r i a ,  were  p r o v i d e d  
by t h e  n a t i o n a l  bank. I n  p r a c t i c e ,  however,  s t a t e  p r e f e r e n c e  
i s  a  d e c i s i v e  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  f u n d s ,  and p r o f i t  d o e s  
n o t  a lways  p l a y  t h e  dominant r o l e .  Hungary, he  added,  i s  a t  
p r e s e n t  i n  a  f a r  from o p t i m a l  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  c a p i t a l  
and l a b o r  m a r k e t s .  An improvement c o u l d  be made by e s t a b l i s h i n g  
a  l a b o r  m a r k e t  where wage i n c r e a s e s  a r e  n o t  de te rmined  by p r o f i t s  
o n l y ,  and  a l s o  by r e f o r m i n g  t h e  c a p i t a l  marke t  s o  t h a t  it i s m o r e  
r e s p o n s i v e  t o  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t s .  
M i t r a  a l s o  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  c r i t e r i a  t h a t  c a n  be used  t o  de- 
t e r m i n e  whe ther  goods s h o u l d  be produced i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  o r  pub- 
l i c  s e c t o r s .  The a n a l y s i s  by Weitzman--to which Dasgupta  had 
drawn a t t e n t i o n  i n  h i s  p resen ta t ion- - showed t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  p r i c e - g u i d e d  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and 
v a r i o u s  q u a n t i t y  c o n t r o l s .  These c o n d i t i o n s  a p p l i e d  when a l l  
members o f  a  team had q u a d r a t i c  p r e f e r e n c e s .  H e  wondered i f  
b e t t e r  performance o f  p r i c e  v e r s u s  q u a n t i t y  s i g n a l s  c o u l d  b e  
made t o  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  v e r s u s  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  d i s t i n c -  
t i o n .  Dasgupta  s a i d  t h a t  i f  t h e  n e t - b e n e f i t  s c h e d u l e  h a s  a  
t h r e s h o l d ,  t h e n  p r i c e s  a r e  n o t  v e r y  r e l i a b l e .  M i t r a  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  t h e  e q u i t y  o b j e c t i v e ,  which i s  o f t e n  used  a s  an  argument  
f o r  governmenta l  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  s h o u l d  be f o r m a l l y  i n c o r p o r a t e d  
i n t o  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  e f f i c a c y  o f  t h e  p r i c e  mechanism a s  
a g a i n s t  q u a n t i t y  r a t i o n i n g  and o t h e r  n o n - l i n e a r  p o l i c i e s .  
S h e s h i n s k i  t h o u g h t  t h a t  a n o t h e r  c r i t e r i o n  migh t  be t h e  h e t e r o -  
g e n e i t y  o f  t a s t e s  o r  t a l e n t s ,  e . g . ,  m u s i c a l  t a l e n t s ,  a s  opposed 
t o  minimum b a s i c  needs  ( i n  h e a l t h ,  and p a r t l y  i n  e d u c a t i o n ) .  
A u g u s t i n o v i c s  a g r e e d  t h a t  b a s i c  n e e d s  do  e x i s t ,  and t h a t  e q u i t y  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  do p l a y  a  r o l e  i n  t h e  n o n c o m p e t i t i v e  s e c t o r .  
Tardos  added t h a t  economic r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  n o t  t h e  o n l y  
c r i t e r i o n  b u t  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i e t i e s  c o u l d  d e c i d e  on what t h e y  
c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be b a s i c  n e e d s ,  which s h o u l d  be p r o v i d e d  by t h e  
p u b l i c  s e c t o r .  E t h i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  p l a y  some r o l e  h e r e ,  
S h e s h i n s k i  responded  by s a y i n g  t h a t  c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  what  c o n s t i -  
t u t e  b a s i c  needs  do  n o t  v a r y  among c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  d i f f e r i n g  
p o l i t i c a l  sys tems .  H e  t h e n  asked  i f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income 
i n  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  was moving t o w a r d s  more e q u a l i t y .  
Tardos replied that there was no need to reduce the range 
of income distribution to improve the situation. With the given 
income distribution one could attain more efficiency by removing 
certain contradictions, e.g., between effort and income, and by 
increasing the number of small production and trade units, so 
that shortages in production, i.e., demand exceeding supply, 
could be overcome. "Black" markets could then be eliminated. 
He said that "black" and "grey" markets do affect income distri- 
bution, although the extent of their influence is statistically 
immeasurable. He added that, in his view, it would be incorrect 
to increase income differentials, but he thought that a decline 
in wage and salary differentials would not occur in the near 
future. At the moment, the issue of efficiency had higher pri- 
ority, and social aims could be reached with the given income 
distribution. 
Klein asked about the time perspective over which managers 
tried to maximize their profits. He also inquired about the 
criteria that a firm would use to decide whether they should 
introduce a new line of products, and whether they could afford 
to take risks. Finally, he asked how the mechanism was used to 
distribute capital gains. 
Tardos answered that an enterprise making losses could now 
always count on more government subsidies and support. Firms 
that wanted to introduce new products would also have to ask 
for support from the central authorities. He then answered the 
question of reallocation of profits by saying that "holding 
banks of conglomerates" should be established to reallocate funds 
on the basis of expected profit. 
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DEMAND FORECASTING AND CAPACITY CREATION 
IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR I 
L. Klein 
This paper describes the Wharton Annual and Industry Fore- 
casting Model, a long-term model for the United States that is 
also applicable to other industrialized Western countries, 
e.g., Canada and the UK. It is being used both by the public 
and private sectors in the United States and by multinational 
organizations. It is a large Keynes-Leontief-type model con- 
taining more than a thousand equations. 
Its formal structure can be represented as follows: 
Y = B-I (I-A)-' CG output conversion 
q'Y = r'G 
q'Y = qlBX 
q'~-l (I-A)-' CG = r'G price conversion 
(value added+ final 
demand) 




I = u n i t  ma t r ix  
A = mat r ix  of  i n t e r m e d i a t e  i npu t -ou tpu t  c o e f f i c i e n t s  
X = g r o s s  ou tpu t  
Y = r e a l  va lue  added 
B = d iagona l  t r ans fo rma t ion  ma t r ix  t r ans fo rming  Y 
i n t o  X 
F = f i n a l  demand 
G = v e c t o r  of components of  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  product  
(GNP) 
C = r e c t a n g u l a r  ma t r ix  r e l a t i n g  G t o  F 
r '  = p r i c e  of f i n a l  demand goods 
p '  = g r o s s  o u t p u t  p r i c e ,  determined a s  a  markup of 
u n i t  f a c t o r  c o s t s  
q '  = value-added p r i c e  
VA = va lue  added = CG (g iven  r e c o n c i l i n g  i t ems)  
I n  t h e  U . S .  model, t h e  i n t e r m e d i a t e  i npu t -ou tpu t  i s  an 
n  x n  m a t r i x ,  w i th  about  2 5  manufacturing s e c t o r s  ( two-d ig i t  
system) and about  2 5  nonmanufacturing s e c t o r s  d e f i n e d ,  e . g . ,  
energy  is  subdiv ided  i n t o  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  g a s ,  c o a l ,  e t c .  The GNP 
is  t hen  equa l  t o  t h e  row sum of  a l l  t h e  columns i n  F ( o r  t h e  
column sum of  rows i n  V A ) .  Another a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r  t h e  Keynes- 
Leon t i e f  model would be a  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  model. The Keynes 
and Leont ie f  models combined r e p r e s e n t  a  production+income+ex- 
p e n d i t u r e  c i r c u l a r  f low system, where t h e  macromodel cannot  be 
w i thou t  t h e  Leont ie f  i n t e r m e d i a t e  f lows ,  and t h e  i n t e r m e d i a t e  
f lows ( o r  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  low p o s i t i o n  of  o u t p u t )  cannot  be  so lved  
wi thou t  t h e  f i n a l  demand f lows.  
The market v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  model a r e  p r i c e s  (wh icha remar -  
k e t  c l e a r i n g ) ,  wages (which e s t a b l i s h  ba lance  i n  t h e  l a b o r  mar- 
k e t ) ,  and i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  (which c l e a r  t h e  s e c u r i t i e s  and money 
m a r k e t s ) .  
There a r e  two problems i n  t h e  model: 
- t h e  row problem--to conve r t  from GNP accounts  t o  X and 
Y: 
- t h e  column problem--to conve r t  from p  t o  q  t o  r .  
The system is dynamic, with the equations of final demand 
depending on distributed lags. To project the system to the 
year 2000, a forecast with continuing 10-year periods was first 
attempted. A feedback system was established by periodically 
inviting model users, representing different sectors, to comment 
on the performance of the model and to present their own projec- 
tion. A 10-year period was seen to be too short for solving 
some problems, and a stretch of 25 years was estimated to be 
more appropriate for policy recommendations dealing with energy 
and related problems. 
To determine inputs for the long-term system, many models 
have been used separately but simultaneously: models of differ- 
ent sectors, cities, states, and global models. A short-term 
business-cycle model was run on a detailed basis, taking into 
consideration government monetary and fiscal policies. Exogenous 
inputs were set for the first 3 years, on an annual basis, to 
reproduce short-run business-cycle results from a quarterly 
model. 
In order to make long-term planning projections, two methods 
were used. The first was the "cut and try" technique, where 
projections are made on the basis of trends in government spend- 
ing, tax systems, monetary policies, and world trade estimates. 
A von Neurnann property is adhered to whereby the real growth 
rate should be equal to the real interest rate. One adjusts the 
exogenous inputs, on the basis of changing trade accounts and 
inflation rates until the desired composition of real growth 
and interest rates is reached. The second method was the opti- 
mal control technique where one optimizes over the solution 
horizon. Policy instruments are selected that bring the solution 
to a minimum deviation from desired targets. This selection of 
instruments determines the values of exogenous variables in some 
important cases. 
The model is used as a basic, live scenario. At the request 
of users (public or private), alternative policies can be intro- 
duced into it, and the simulation can be performed again. Con- 
venient computer programs that can be rapidly processed havebeen 
developed to make these projections. 
In the public sector, the model is used, together with 
others, as an aid to policymaking, but the models are not auto- 
matically or solely relied upon in the process of policy forma- 
tion. The private sector also makes use of this model. 
Tables of the results of the forecasting model for the U.S. 
economy follow at the end of this paper. Table 1 (selected in- 
dicators) presents a quick overview of the U.S. economy up to 
the year 2001: GNP at current (1978) and 1972 dollars, popula- 
tion, labor force, GNP deflator, etc. Some basic ratios are 
expected to remain stable, e.g., the labor share in the national 
income remains at approximately 75%. 
Table 2 g i v e s  t h e  breakdown of GNP i n t o  pe r sona l  consump- 
t i o n  expend i tu re s ,  g r o s s  p r i v a t e  domest ic  inves tment ,  n e t  ex- 
p o r t s  of goods, s e r v i c e s  and government expend i tu re s  i n  c u r r e n t  
(1978) d o l l a r s  and i n  1972 d o l l a r s .  A GNP growth r a t e ,  a t  con- 
s t a n t  p r i c e s ,  o f  around 3% is p r o j e c t e d  f o r  t h e  pe r iod  1977-2001 
be ing  s l i g h t l y  h ighe r  (24%) i n  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  u n t i l  1980. The 
average  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  over  t h e  p e r i o d  i s  e s t i m a t e d  a t  4.5%, 
t h e  unemployment r a t e  i s  p r o j e c t e d  t o  f a l l  from i t s  p r e s e n t  
l e v e l  t o  about  4-5s. 
Tab le s  3  and 4 p r e s e n t  t h e  growth r a t e s  of  f i x e d  investment  
and c a p i t a l  s t o c k ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  




















































